


Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and Dependency Status

Aline O. Quester Adebayo M. Adedeji







CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

92-04774

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

Work conducted under contract N00014-91-C-0002.

This Research Memorandum represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

REPORT D	OCUMENTATIO	N PAGE	Form Approved OPM No. 0704-0188
maintaining the data needed and reviewing the for reducing this burden, to Washington Headq	collection of information. Send comments regarding	this burden estimate or any other asp ons and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Dav	instructions, searching existing data sources gathering and ect of this collection of information, including suggestions is Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT	TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	July 1991	1	Final
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The	ne Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and Depend	ency Status	C - N00014-91-C-0002
			PE - 65153M
6. AUTHOR(S) Aline O. Quester, Adebayo M. Adede	eii		PR - C0031
	•		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAM	E(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Center for Naval Analyses			CRM 91-64
4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268			
Tibhandia, Tigana 22002 0200			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENC	Y NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development	Command (WF 13F)		REFORT NOVEER
Studies and Analyses Branch	(· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Quantico, Virginia 22134			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	<u> </u>	.	
	,		
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STA	TEMENT		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for Public Release; Distri	bution Unlimited		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		_	nalyzed in this research memorandum. Particular Force Qualification Test (AFQT) score catagories.
=	for Marines of different marital statuses,		
14. SUBJECT TERMS Demography Enlisted personnel Fr	mily members. Look model, Maria - Ca	me personnal Mantal ability	15. NUMBER OF PAGES Personnel 117
	amily members, Logit model, Marine Co stment, Statistical analysis, Statistical d		,
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA	ATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT CPR	OF THIS PAGE CPR	OF ABSTRACT CE	PR SAR
NSN 7540-01-280-5500			Standard Form 298, (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 299-01



CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 • (703) 824-2000

15 August 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 91-64

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 91-64, Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and Dependency Status, by Aline O. Quester and Adebayo M. Adedeji, Jul 1991

- 1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
- 2. First-term reenlistment decisions for recommended and eligible Marines in FY 1980 through FY 1990 are analyzed in this research memorandum. Particular attention is given to the retention effects of selective reenlistment bonuses on Marines in different Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score categories. Additionally, reenlistment behavior for Marines of different marital statuses, grades, and length of initial enlistment contracts are analyzed.

Lewis R. Cabe

Director

Manpower and Training Program

Distribution List: Reverse page



Acces	sion For	/
NTIS	GRA&I	10
DTIC	TAR	ā
Unabe	प्र ्वत्यं	<u> </u>
Julia	Jioni ion_	·
	ibntics/	
Dist	Avail sos Special	/or
A-1		

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 91-64

Distribution List

```
SNDL
      CG FMFLANT
24J1
24J2
      CG FMFPAC
45A2 CG I MEF
45A2 CG II MEF
45A2 CG III MEF
45B CG FIRST MARDIV
45B
      CG FOURTH MARDIV
45B
      CG SECOND MARDIV
45B
      CG THIRD MARDIV
45Q
      CG FIRST FSSG
45Q
      CG FOURTH FSSG
      CG SECOND FSSG
45Q
45Q
      CG THIRD FSSG
46B
      CG FIRST MAW
46B
      CG FOURTH MAW
46B
      CG SECOND MAW
46B
      CG THIRD MAW
A1
      DASN - MANPOWER (2 copies)
A1H
     ASSTSECNAV MRA
A5
      PERS-2 - Military Personnel Policy Div.
A6
      DNIGMC/IGME
A6
      HQMC AVN
         Attn: Manpower
A6
      HQMC MPR & RA
         Attn: DC/S for Manpower (2 copies)
         Attn: Dir, Personnel Procurement Division (2 copies)
         Attn: Dir, Manpower Plans and Policy Division (4 copies)
         Attn: Dir, Personnel Management Division
         Attn: Manpower & Evaluation Branch (2 copies)
A6
      HQMC OLA
A6
      HQMC PA
A6
      HQMC R&P (2 copies)
FF38 USNA
         Attn: Nimitz Library
FF42 NAVPGSCOL
         Attn: Code 64
         Attn: Library (2 copies)
FJA13
         NAVPERSRANDCEN
         Attn: Technical Director (Code 01)
         Attn: Technical Library
         Attn: Director, Manpower Systems (Code 11)
         Attn: Director, Personnel Systems (Code 12)
         Attn: Information Support (Code 113)
V12
      CG MAGTEC
V12
      CG MCCDC
OPNAV
OP-01
```

Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and Dependency Status

Aline O. Quester Adebayo M. Adedeji

Operations and Support Division



ABSTRACT

First-term reenlistment decisions for recommended and eligible Marines in FY 1980 through FY 1990 are analyzed in this research memorandum. Particular attention is given to the retention effects of selective reenlistment bonuses on Marines in different Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score categories. Additionally, reenlistment behavior for Marines of different marital statuses, grades, and length of initial enlistment contracts are analyzed.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the recent past, there have been substantial changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines, as well as changes in Marine Corps personnel policy. First, enlisted Marines today are both smarter and better educated than they were in the earlier years of the 1980s. Second, although the percentage of recruits who enter the Marine Corps married or with dependents has remained virtually unchanged over time, the Marine Corps has experienced substantial increases in the marriage and dependency rate for enlisted personnel. Third, first-term enlistment contracts have been lengthened so that Marines now average more years of service at the first reenlistment point. Finally, there has been an increase in both time in service (TIS) and time in grade (TIG) for promotions to corporal (Cpl) and sergeant (Sgt). The impact of these changes on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted personnel (zone A decisions) is the subject of this research memorandum.

The main analysis focused on zone A reenlistment decisions of a random sample of almost 27,000 Marines in the FY 1980 through FY 1990 period. Reenlistment probability was estimated as a function of the selected-reenlistment-bonus (SRB) multiple, grade, background characteristics, length of the initial contract, whether or not an extension was executed immediately before the decision, military occupational specialty (MOS) group, a civilian-to-military pay index, and the civilian unemployment rate.

Table I details the characteristics of the sample as well as the average reenlistment rate of Marines with the different characteristics. A close examination of the average differences in reenlistment rates is warranted, as the multivariate statistical analysis substantiates the findings in table I.

SRBs exert a strong and regular impact on the decision to reenlist. Over the period, 55.5 of the reenlistment decisions were made by Marines in MOSs not offered an SRB; the reenlistment rate for these Marines was 24.6 percent. In contrast, the reenlistment rate for Marines in MOSs offered level-one SRBs was 34.5 percent. For each increase in the bonus award level, table I shows an increase of about 6 percentage points in the reenlistment rate. Moreover, detailed analysis in the main text shows that the strongest impact of SRBs is for Marines with the highest scores on the AFQT. In brief, SRBs increase both the quantity and the quality of Marine Corps reenlistments.

^{1.} The bonus dollars a Marine will receive is the SRB level multiplied by the Marine's monthly base pay multiplied by the number of years for which the Marine reenlists.

Table I. Reenlistment rate, by characteristics of recommended and eligible Marines making Zone A reenlistment decisions, FY 1980 through FY 1990

Characteristic	Percent of sample	Reenlistment rate (%)
Overall average		32.4
SRB level offered		
None	55.5	24.6
Level one	9.8	34.5
Level two	16.7	39.1
Level three	8.0	45.7
Level four	6.9	50.6
Level five	2.3	53.5
Level six	. 8	59.6
Grade		
E3	23.0	21.2
E4	58.8	33.5
E5/E6	18.2	44.5
Marital/dependency status		
Not married, no dependents	64.6	24.8
Not married, dependents	2.6	48.4
Married	35.4	44.6
Either married or with dependents	38.0	44.9
Two or more dependents	13.0	49.0
Other individual background		
characteristics		
Male	95.2	31.6
Female	4.8	49.0
Black	18.0	50.2
Hispanic	5.7 76.3	31.2
Not black or Hispanic HSDG (Tier I)	76.3 84.5	28.3 31.1
AFQT 1-II ^a	22.7	30.5
AFQT I-IIIAa	37.9	31.2
Length of prior contract		
Three years	21.3	29.2
Four years	77.6	33.2
Five or six years	1.1	39.1
,		

a. If missing AFQT scores are omitted, 32.0 percent of the sample are AFQT category I-II and 53.4 percent are AFQT category I-IIIA. The AFQT scores of recommended and eligible personnel have increased significantly over the decade. In FY 1990, 36.1 percent of Zone A recommended and eligible Marines were AFQT category I-II and 60.5 percent were AFQT category I-IIIA.

The relationship between AFQT score categories at accession and after the first reenlistment is a subject of considerable interest. The 1980s saw substantial increases in the proportion of Marine Corps accessions with high AFQT scores. These Marines with high AFQT scores have lower first-term attrition and are thus more likely to be in the population of recommended and eligible Marines making reenlistment decisions. While table I shows a slightly lower than average reenlistment rate among AFQT category I-II Marines (30.5 versus 32.4) for the sample of reenlistment decisions in the 1980s, the reenlistment rates in FY 1989 and FY 1990 of these category I-II Marines were higher than average. The last big increase in accession quality was in FY 1986, and it is these Marines who are now making reenlistment decisions. It appears that the Marine Corps investments in improving accession quality are paying off in higher retention, as well as in better performance and lower first-term attrition.

Marines who make their first reenlistment decision at a higher grade are more likely to reenlist. Over the decade, however, as promotion rates slowed, there were some changes in the reenlistment rates by grade. The largest changes were in the lance corporal reenlistment rate, which increased sharply. Presumably making the reenlistment decision at the grade of lance corporal at the end of the decade had a more positive connotation about a successful first term of service than it had at the beginning of the decade.

Reenlistment rates of Marines are sharply delineated by marital/dependency status; Marines who are married (or have dependents) at this decision point are considerably more likely to reenlist than those that are single. The average reenlistment rate for unmarried Marines was 24.8 percent, while the average rate for Marines who were married or who had dependents was almost 45 percent. Although the authors are not aware of any previous analysis of Marine Corps retention that explicitly examined marital or dependency status, these findings are consistent with findings for the other services.

The estimating equations fit the data extremely well, and coefficient estimates achieved high levels of statistical significance. Overall, the results suggest that higher SRBs, higher grade, longer initial enlistments, females, blacks, and married individuals are more likely to reenlist. Finally, the impact of SRBs is strongest for Marines who test in categories I and II of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

While the Marine Corps has used its SRB budget to channel reenlistments to required personnel, it has considerably less ability to manipulate the relationship of military to civilian pay or the civilian unemployment rate. Yet, both of these factors have played important roles in the reenlistment equation, particularly in the early 1980s. A 1-percentage point increase in the CNA-constructed military-to-civilian pay index for first-term personnel was associated with a 0.6-percentage point increase in the reenlistment rate. Similarly, a 1-percentage point increase in the 20- to 24-year-old male unemployment rate (a

fairly small historical change) was associated with a 0.6-percentage point increase in the Marine Corps reenlistment rate.

Further analysis focused on the timing of the reenlistment. FY 1989 decisions were partitioned into those made before the fiscal year of contract expiration (out-year reenlistments) and those made in-year. The basic findings are that Marines with longer initial cotracts and high AFQT scores are more likely to be out-year reenlisters than in-year reenlisters. Higher SRB levels induce out-year reenlistments. Additionally, proportionally fewer of the reenlistments for black Marines are out-year than for the other racial/ethnic groups. For other characteristics, in FY 1989 at least, Marines appear to reenlist in roughly the same mix of in-year and early reenlistments as is average for the Corps.

Finally, during the course of the study, a permanent longitudinal decision database was constructed, and computer programs to update these files were finalized. Thus, future retention analyses can extract decisions and the background information on Marines making these decisions in a time frame that lags real-time decisions by only about three months.

CONTENTS

Pag	zе
Illustrations	Κi
Tables	Κi
Introduction	1
Data for the Analysis	5 5
Civilian-Pay Index Data	10
Reenlisting in the Marine Corps	13
FY 1980 Through FY 1990 1 Estimating the Reenlistment Probability:	13
•	17
	18
	23
	24
Predicted Reenlistment Rates by Marital and Dependency Status	25
	26 27
Out-Year Versus In-Year Reenlistments 3	33
Summary and Conclusions	34
References 3	37
Appendix A: Variables on the Retention Database A-1 - A-	-4
Appendix B: Primary Military Occupational Specialty Codes B-1 - B-1	LO
Appendix C: Historical Table of SRB Multiples, by PMOS C-1 - C-2	23
Appendix D: The Logit Equation D-	-1
Appendix E: Logit Reenlistment Equation Estimates With Separate Indicator Variables for Each SRB Level E-1 - E-	- 3
Appendix F: Logit Reenlistment Equations for Individual MOSs F-1 - F-1	17
Appendix G: Additional Information on In-Year Versus Early Reenlistments	- 2

ILLUSTRATIONS

	1	age
1	Quality Recruits (AFQT I-IIIA HSDGs) as a Percentage of Total Recruits	1
2	Dependency Rates for Enlisted Marines	2
3	Percentage of Marine Corps Accessions, by Length of Initial Contract	3
4	Grade Distribution at First Reenlistment Decision: Recommended and Eligible Marines With Initial Obligations of Four Years	4
5	The Unemployment Rate of 20- to 24-Year-Old Males	8
6	Index of Military Pay to Civilian Pay: Males, Age 20 to 24	12
7	Example of a Logit Curve	18
	TABLES	
		ege?
1	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990	Page
1 2	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines,	
_	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990 Reenlistment Rate, by Characteristics of Recommended and Eligible Marines Making Zone A Reenlistment Decisions,	11
2	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990	11
2	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990	11 14 20
3	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990	11 14 20 25
2 3 4 5	Zone A Decisions for Recommended and Eligible Marines, FY 1980 Through Third Quarter FY 1990	11 14 20 25 26

INTRODUCTION

In the recent past, there have been substantial changes in the characteristics of enlisted Marines, as well as changes in Marine Corps personnel policy. The impact of these changes on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted personnel, and on the ability of the Marine Corps to retain quality personnel, is the subject of this research memorandum.

First, during the past decade, the Marine Corps substantially improved accession quality. Today's enlisted Marines are both smarter and better educated than they were in the earlier years of the 1980s. In the past ten years, the percentage of recruits who were high school diploma graduates (HSDGs, or Tier I) with test scores in the top half of the nationally normed Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT) more than doubled (see figure 1). While it is well known that accessions with these characteristics have lower attrition during the first term of service and higher levels of job performance (see [1 through 4]), there is little information regarding how these Marines respond to reenlistment incentives offered by the Marine Corps.




Figure 1. Quality recruits (AFQT I-IIIA HSDGs) as a percentage of total recruits

Second, although the percentage of recruits who enter the Marine Corps married or with dependents has remained virtually unchanged over time, the Marine Corps has experienced substantial increases in the marriage and dependency rate for enlisted personnel, particularly for personnel within the first term of service. Figure 2 details some of these changes; a more complete discussion can be found in [5]. In

addition to budgetary implications for the changes in marital and dependency rates, questions have arisen about possible differences in retention behavior of Marines with different marriage and dependency statuses.




Figure 2. Dependency rates for enlisted Marines

Third, the Marine Corps has made substantial changes in the length of the first-term enlistment contract. While in the early 1980s first-term enlistment contracts were generally three or four years, by the latter part of the 1980s they were generally four or six years (see figure 3). FY 1990 is the first year that substantial numbers of Marines with longer initial enlistment contracts made reenlistment decisions. Little is known about the impact of the length of initial contract upon the subsequent decision to reenlist or leave the Marine Corps.

^{1.} Additional concerns relate to readiness issues that are outside the scope of this paper.

^{2.} In FY 1990, slightly over 1,000 Marines with five- or six-year initial enlistment contracts made first-term reenlistment decisions. These numbers will grow three- or four-fold in FY 1991 and years following.

Finally, at least since the mid-1980s, there has been an increase in both time in service (TIS) and time in grade (TIG) for promotions to corporal (Cpl) and sergeant (Sgt). This slowdown in promotion has been the result of high retention and little change in the grade structure (see [6] for more information).





Figure 3. Percentage of Marine Corps accessions, by length of initial contract

Figure 4 illustrates the grade distribution of recommended and eligible Marines making their first reenlistment decisions at three points in time, FY 1980 through FY 1984, FY 1985 through FY 1988, and FY 1989 through June 1990. In order to reflect only changes in the speed of promotion, the figure depicts only Marines with four-year initial enlistment contracts. While in the early 1980s slightly over 35 percent of Marines making their first reenlistment decision were sergeants, this percentage had shrunk to less than 5 percent in FY 1989

^{1.} Promotions in grades corporal to sergeant-major are vacancy driven. For a promotion to occur, a space must be available in the next grade.

2. See [6] for a more detailed examination of changes in TIS and TIG in the decade of the 1980s.

and FY 1990. Since it is well established that grade is an important factor in the reenlistment decision, it is important to understand how the slowdown in promotion rates has affected reenlistment decisions.



a. Staff sergeants have always been less than 1 percent of this population,
 (0.5 percent in FY 1980-1984, 0.1 percent in FY 1985-1988, and 0.4 percent in FY 1989-1990).

Figure 4. Grade distribution at first reenlistment decision: recommended and eligible Marines with initial obligations of four years

Against this backdrop of changes in both the characteristics of enlisted Marines and in Marine Corps policy, this work examines the first-term reenlistment decisions of Marines in the FY 1980 through FY 1990 time period. The Marine Corps makes extremely careful selections at this reenlistment point. Local commanding officers certify Marines as recommended and eligible for reenlistment, and Marine Corps monitors at Headquarters determine whether additional personnel are

^{1.} Because of changes in the length of the initial enlistment--in particular, because FY 1989 through FY 1990 were the first years that five- and six-year obligors made reenlistment decisions--figure 4 somewhat overstates the changes in grade for all Marines at the first reenlistment point. In FY 1990, for example, 8 percent of all recommended and eligible Marines making first-term reenlistment decisions were sergeants (see table 8).

required in the Marine's MOS before approval of a reenlistment request. Marine Corps policy states that this "quality cut"--by the Marine's individual record as certified by the Marine's commanding officer and by Marine Corps needs as certified by the monitors--be achieved before promotion to sergeant (E5).

After a detailed examination of reenlistment decisions throughout the entire period, reenlistment decisions in FY 1988 through FY 1990 are separately analyzed to identify possible changes in behavior as well as to investigate the reenlistment behavior of Marines with five- and six-year initial contracts. All analysis is restricted to those Marines that the Marine Corps has deemed "recommended and eligible" for reenlistment.

DATA FOR THE ANALYSIS

Personnel File Data

Other tasks by CNA on the Marine Corps Enlisted Retention Study constructed a permanent longitudinal decision-based personnel file for all enlisted Marines (the longitudinal ARSTAT tracking file--see [7]). This file contains background information, records of all grade changes (promotions/demotions), and a history of all important decisions (accession, effective extensions, reenlistments, and separations) for each enlisted Marine. For each of these decisions, considerable information on the Marine's status at the time of the decision is retained. Updated quarterly, the file begins in October 1978.

The analysis described in this research memorandum is restricted to reenlistment decisions, by "recommended and eligible" Marines, in the first 72 months of service. These are often called Zone A decisions, and reenlistment bonuses in these length-of-service cells are identified as Zone A reenlistment bonuses. This reenlistment decision is a critical one for the Marine Corps and is currently the only reenlistment decision for which skill requirements of the Corps are taken into account. Marines in their second enlistment are regarded as part of the career force.

^{1.} The Career Force Alignment Plan determines the skill requirements by MOS. If additional personnel are not required in the Marine's MOS, an attempt is made to find an MOS that is short of personnel and for which the Marine qualifies. The introduction of career force controls in 1985 and 1986 considerably tightened this process.

^{2.} The file is transaction based and includes all accession, reenlistment, and separation information. All transactions for Marines who entered the Marine Corps after 1978 will be found in the file. For Marines who were in the Marine Corps in 1978, only the transactions since 1978 are included in the file.

^{3.} The career force can be defined by length of service, grade, or by the enlistment (second or beyond).

For each decision, variables that reflect the Marine's background characteristics and variables that reflect the Marine's decision or his status at the time of the decision were constructed. Appendix A provides more detail on how the data were constructed. Background characteristics include gender, racial/ethnic group, education and test scores at entry into the Marine Corps, and the length of his initial obligation. Variables that describe the Marine at the time of the decision include the Marine's age, grade, whether or not the Marine had executed an extension before the decision, a set of variables describing marital/dependency status, and the Marine's primary military occupational specialty (PMOS).

The final step was to append information that characterized the environment at the time the Marine made the reenlistment decision--the level of the SRB for the Marine's PMOS at the decision, the civilian unemployment rate for 20- to 24-year-old males, and an index of military to civilian pay. Because CNA has been unable to locate information on SRB bonus multiples for either FY 1978 or FY 1979, the Zone A reenlistment database begins in FY 1980.

SRB, Civilian Unemployment Rates, and Military-to-Civilian-Pay Index Data

The direction of relationships between reenlistments and pay (either through bonuses or regular compensation) has been well established both theoretically and empirically (see [8], [9], or [10]). Other things being equal, larger bonuses or higher levels of military pay relative to civilian pay are associated with higher reenlistment rates. Similarly, higher civilian unemployment rates are associated with higher retention rates for military personnel.

Occasionally, however, the meaning of these relationships is still misunderstood. The theoretical model does not say that a Marine will leave the Corps if the Marine can earn more in the civilian sector than in the Marine Corps. There are clearly substantial numbers of Marines who would earn more as civilians than they earn as Marines (and, conversely, probably nontrivial numbers of ex-Marines would have been better off financially had they remained in the Corps).

^{1.} Most analyses in this paper group the PMOSs into seven categories. Appendix B details the categories by PMOS and also contains a count of the number of decisions by PMOS for a random sample of almost 27,000 Zone A reenlistment decisions in the FY 1980 through June 1990 period. In recent years, a small number of reenlistees have received a selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) for their additional military occupational specialty (AMOS). AMOS information for the Marine was not available on the input tapes used to create the ARSTAT longitudinal tracking file. Thus, in this analysis, any SRBs given for an AMOS are ignored; all SRB information is based on the Marine's PMOS.

The relationship is probabilistic rather than deterministic, suggesting that changes in the relative compensation can change reenlistment probabilities. And, with given preferences or attitudes toward military life, some Marines would be indifferent between staying or leaving the Marine Corps, and changes in military pay relative to civilian pay would result in some Marines deciding whether or not to stay. Thus, other things being equal, when military compensation rises relative to civilian compensation, reenlistment rates can be expected to increase.


An SRB is a reenlistment incentive used carefully by Marine Corps planners to shape the composition of reenlistments. (The total number of bonus dollars a Marine will receive is determined by multiplying the SRB multiple (from zero to six) by the Marine's monthly base pay and then by the number of years for which the individual reenlists.) Since FY 1983, the Marine Corps has paid reenlistment bonuses only for reenlistments of four years or longer. Planners affect reenlistment rates by varying the bonus multiples for the different MOSs. Previous work at CNA had established historical SRB bonus multiple files from FY 1980 to FY 1985 (see [11]). These were updated with Marine Corps messages through June of 1990 and are reproduced in table C-1 of appendix C. 1

Some MOSs have never had an SRB, while others have usually had an SRB. As the information in appendix C illustrates, however, the general pattern is frequent adjustments in the multiple to a particular MOS, as Marine Corps planners try to shape the force. For example, PMOS 0231 (Intelligence Specialist) had SRB levels of zero, one, three, four, and five over this ten-year period. The level was zero for most of FY 1980; three for FY 1981-1982; four, then three, then one for FY 1983; one or zero for FY 1984 and FY 1985; and three, four, or five since FY 1986.

The civilian unemployment rate for 20- to 24-year-old males was chosen as an overall barometer of the ease or difficulty of finding civilian employment (see figure 5). The variation in the unemployment rate over the time period has been substantial, with the 1983 recession clearly visible in the figure.

^{1.} The change from three- to four-year reenlistments for SRB eligibility was made in FY 1983, and it can be clearly seen in the length of reenlistment commitments made by Marines in MOSs offering SRBs. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not offered level-six SRBs since FY 1983 (see table C-2 of appendix C).

Depending upon the decision year, between 2 and 5 percent of the reenlistees in MOSs with SRBs reenlisted for a shorter time than was required for payment of the SRB. For example, there were 4,892 reenlistments in FY 1989 (2,165 in MOSs with a bonus and 2,727 in MOSs without a bonus). In the MOSs without a bonus, 7 percent of the reenlistments were for two years, 40 percent for three years, 50 percent for four years, and 3 percent for five or six years. In the MOSs with an SRB, 2 percent of the reenlistments were for two years, 2 percent for three years, 79 percent for four years, and 17 percent for five or six years.



SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics; all rates are seasonally adjusted.

Figure 5. The unemployment rate of 20- to 24-year-old males

Previous analyses of reenlistment decisions have taken one of two general approaches to modeling the impact of compensation. One approach utilizes the annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) methodology (see [8 through 11]). This methodology focuses the reenlistment decision on differences in future expected compensation for the two choices (remaining in the Marine Corps or leaving for civilian sector employment). For each Marine an ACOL variable is constructed that reflects the difference in expected compensation (military minus civilian) over the work

horizon. 1 The main difficulty with the ACOL methodology is that it has been difficult to update (or project) these expected pay streams accurately.

The alternative approach, used here, is to construct a pay index that reflects only the changes in average levels of military-to-civilian compensation. Unlike the ACOL model, in this approach only some of the impact of pay on the reenlistment decision is attributed to the pay variable. Some differences in reenlistment propensities for Marines with given characteristics are probably related to differences in relative pay. Measuring the impact of pay by an index has several advantages, the most important being that such an index is straightforward to update and project.

Average military pay is a function of the congressionally authorized increases to the pay table as well as an individual's length of service and grade. It was decided to make our military pay variable reflect only changes in the pay table. For average civilian pay, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes a quarterly series on the "usual weekly earnings" of full-time wage and salary workers [13]. To reflect the civilian opportunities for Marines making zone A reenlistment decisions, the usual weekly earnings of full-time 20- to 24-year-old male wage and salary workers was used.

^{1.} Expected civilian earnings are estimated as a function of education, race/ethnic background, gender, AFQT category, etc. These earnings are projected until retirement, and then the entire expected earnings stream is appropriately discounted to the present-year dollars. The expected earnings stream, should the Marine remain in the Corps, is computed, discounted to present-year dollars. The annualized cost of leaving is the difference between the military and civilian pay streams.

^{2.} Any systematic deviation from the average relative compensation for Marines with given characteristics will be reflected in differences in reenlistment propensities for Marines with those characteristics. For example, female Marines are more likely to reenlist than male Marines. A part of the reason for the higher female reenlistment rate may be due to differences in military/civilian pay ratios for them.

^{3.} For military pay, the last Quarterly Review of Military Compensation had built a series for regular military compensation (see [12]). The study team updated this series to the present. All the statistical models reported in this paper contain the individual's grade and the length of his initial contract. Thus, some of the impact of pay will be found in the effects estimated for grade and years of service.

^{4.} The last decade has shown considerable change in the civilian earnings of males in different age groups. In particular, the earnings of males in their twenties have fallen relative to the earnings of older males. Thus, using a wage index for all males would increasingly overstate the civilian wage opportunities for young males in the years of the 1980s.

The pay index was constructed by dividing the military pay series by the civilian pay series and normalizing the index to 1.0 for the first quarter of FY 1979. Because military pay changes only periodically (usually once a year) and the civilian pay changes each quarter, an index constructed simply by dividing military pay by civilian pay would jump up at the increase in the pay table and then gently erode for the next three quarters. Military pay increases are, however, anticipated and usually announced months in advance. Thus, the index was smoothed by averaging (the pay index is the simple average of pay index value for the current quarter and for the next two quarters).

Figure 6 displays how the pay index has changed over time. The 1981 and 1982 military pay increases were substantial and are clearly visible in the figure. Since FY 1983, however, the index has been relatively flat, meaning that there has been no trend since 1983 in the relationship between average military and civilian pay for young men.

Zone A Decisions

There were over 225,000 zone A decisions (reenlist, extend for at least one year, or separate recommended and eligible) between FY 1980 and June 1990. Table 1 summarizes these decisions. First, there has been considerable variation in both the reenlistment rate and the number of reenlistments per year. Generally, however, there were more decisions in the early years of the 1980s when the length of the first-term contract was shorter. Second, extensions of one year or more have never been very common for first-term Marines. There have been virtually no long extensions since FY 1983 and none at all since FY 1984. Since an extension merely postpones the time when a decision to reenlist or separate is made, it was decided to restrict the analysis to "final" decisions--to reenlist or to separate.

Table 1 further divides reenlistments into those made within the fiscal year the initial contract expires (in-year reenlistments) and those made before the fiscal year the initial contract expires (out-year reenlistments). Analysis of the impact of bonuses or military pay needs to take all reenlistments into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates. Marine Corps end-strength planners, however, focus on meeting end-strength for the current fiscal year. Marines whose contracts will expire in the next fiscal year are committed for this fiscal year: that is, whether they reenlist now has no effect on current year's

^{1.} The index was normalized to 1 for the first quarter of FY 1979. The choice of normalization period is arbitrary. The usefulness of the index is in identifying changes in relative compensation between the military and civilian sectors. The precise value of the index at a point in time is not particularly meaningful.

^{2.} Marines who extend are not excluded from the data set; they enter as an observation when they finally make a decision either to reenlist or to leave.

Table 1. Zone A decisions for recommended and eligible Marines, FY 1980 through third quarter FY 1990


	Ŗ	Reenlistments				
Fiscal year	(1) Total reenlist- ments	(2) In-year reenligt- ments	(3) Out-year reenligt- ments	(4) Number that extend at least one year	(5) Number that leave	(1)/((1)+(3)) (reenlistment rate)
1980 1982 1982 1984 1985 1986 1989 1989 1989	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	ი ლა ღოა ღოა ლა და და და და ლა ლა და	2,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,4,6,	1,3899 1,3497 262 262 0000 0000	71,306 12,222 12,222 13,522 13,524 13,533 13	<u>૱ૡૡૢ૽ૡ૽૱ૡ૱૱</u> ૱૱ઌ૽ૺ૱૱૱૱૱

NOTE: Includes Marines whose component codes indicate that they count for activeduty end strength (11, 12, 13, 3B, A2, A3, A5, A7, AA, AB, C1, C2, C3, C9, CB, CD, CH), who have less than 72 months of service, and who have not previously received a Zone A bonus. Of the 225,642 decisions, 4,707 (2.1 percent) were on two-year contracts, 51,652 (22.9 percent) were on three-year contracts, 166,406 (73.7 percent) were on four-year contracts, 260 (0.1 percent) were on five-year contracts, and 2,617 (1.2 percent) were on six-year contracts before the decision. Marines on two-year contracts were primarily making their second reenlistment decision in Zone A; over 80 percent of these decisions were in FY 1980 through FY 1984 (three-year initial contracts, followed by two-year reenlistments without a selected reenlistment bonus (SRB), and then the decision captured in this analysis).

In-year reenlistments are defined as reenlistments in the fiscal year of the end current contract (ECC). Out-year reenlistments are defined to be reenlistments in a year prior to the ECC.

Through the third quarter only. It is assumed that reenlistments in the fourth quarter of FY 1990 will be primarily out-year reenlistments. ۵.

endstrength because their current contracts commit them for this fiscal year. Because strength planners must estimate this year's expected losses in order to derive required accessions, predicting in-year reenlistments--reenlistments of Marines whose contract will expire within the year--are of particular importance. Possible differences in the characteristics of Marines who reenlist out-year versus in-year will be analyzed separately in a later part of the paper.



NOTE: Constructed by CNA using data from OASD (FM&P) and Bureau of Labor Statistics

Figure 6. Index of military pay to civilian pay: males, age 20 to 24

^{1.} Marine Corps policy concerning out-year reenlistments has changed over time. In FY 1983, for example, the Marine Corps stopped all out-year reenlistments in mid-year. Because a complete historical record for these policies was unavailable, the analysis of in-year versus out-year reenlistments was restricted to recent reenlistment decisions.

While it is possible to tabulate decisions for over 225,000 Marines, it is not practical to estimate retention models with this number of observations. Thus, from this universe of all reenlistment or separation decisions of zone A enlisted Marines from FY 1980 through the third quarter of FY 1990, a random sample was drawn for analysis. The final sample included the reenlistment or separation records for 26,840 Marines.

REENLISTING IN THE MARINE CORPS

Descriptive Statistics for Zone A Reenlistments: FY 1980 Through FY 1990

Table 2 details the characteristics of the sample. There were 8,702 reenlistments and 18,138 separations (an average reenlistment rate of 32.4) for this random sample of recommended and eligible Marines making first-term reenlistment decisions in the FY 1980 through FY 1990 period. The explanatory variables that will be used to differentiate reenlistment probabilities are grouped in the table by category (SRB level, grade, etc.). The table details the percentage of the sample represented by the characteristic, the reenlistment rate for Marines with the particular characteristic, and whether or not Marines with the characteristic have more than an average proportion of their reenlistment out-year. A close examination of the differences in reenlistment rates shown in these tabulations is warranted, as the multivariate statistical analyses that follow substantiate the story told by these average differences.

The first category is the SRB level offered the Marine. Over the period, 55.5 percent of Marines making this reenlistment decision were not offered an SRB, 9.8 percent were offered a level-one bonus, 16.7 percent a level-two bonus, 8.0 percent a level-three bonus, 6.9 percent a level-four bonus, 2.3 percent a level-five bonus, and 0.8 percent a level-six bonus. The table reveals a strong and regular impact for SRB on the decision to reenlist. The average difference in the reenlistment rate for Marines offered a level-one SRB (versus no SRB) is 10 percentage points. And, the average reenlistment rate rises about 6 percentage points for each unit increase in the SRB level. Moreover, SRBs tilt the reenlistments toward early (out-year) decisions.

As expected, Marines who make a zone A decision at a higher grade are more likely to reenlist. While only 21.2 percent of lance corporals reenlisted, 33.5 percent of corporals and 44.5 percent of sergeants reenlisted. Since table 2 summarizes information from over a decade of decisions, however, several factors are embedded in these average differences in reenlistment rates by grade. One important factor is the slowdown in the speed of promotion over the decade.

^{1.} A small number of observations were dropped because of missing or clearly bad data.

^{2.} There have been no level-six bonuses offered since FY 1983.

Table 2. Reenlistment rate by characteristics of recommended and eligible Marines making Zone A reenlistment decisions, FY 1980 through FY 1990

		R	eenlistment
Characteristic	Percent of sample	Rate (%)	More likely than average to be out-year
Overall average		32.4	
SRB level offered			
None	55.5	24.6	No
Level one	9.8	34.5	Yes
Level two	16.7	39.1	Yes
Level three	8.0	45.7	Yes
Level four	6.9	50.6	Yes
Level five	2.3	53.5	Yes
Level six	.8	59.6	Yes
Grade			
E3	23.0	21.2	Yes
E4	58.8	33.5	No
E5/6	18.2	44.5	Yes
Marital/dependency status			
Not married, no dependents	64.6	24.8	No
Not married, dependents	2.6	48.4	No
Married	35.4	44.6	Yes
Either married or with dependents	38.0	44.9	Yes
Two or more dependents	13.0	49.0	Yes
Other individual background characteristics b			
Male	95.2	31.6	No
Female	4.8	49.0	Yes
Black	18.0	50.2	No
Hispanic	5.7	31.2	No
Not black or hispanic	76.3	28.3	Yes
HSDG (Tier I)	84.5	31.1	No
AFQT I-II	22.7	30.5	Yes
AFQT I-IIIA	37.9	31.2	Yes
Length of prior contract			
Three years	21.3	29.2	No
Four years	77.6	33.2	Yes
Five or six years	1.1	39.1	Yes

Table 2. (Continued)

		Reenlistment		
Characteristic	Percent of sample ^a	Rate (%)	More likely than average to be out-year	
Other Marine Corps background		-		
Extension prior to decision	11.0	46.4	No	
MOS area				
Infantry	27.7	23.3	No	
Air mechanical, fixed-wing	5.7	36.3	Yes	
Air mechanical, helicopter	3.1	33.1	No	
Air technical	8.6	32.9	Yes	
Air, other	5.1	40.4	Yes	
Other technical	9.7	28.1	No	
Administration	13.1	44.5	No	
Other, MOS	27.0	35.1	Yes	

a. The data are a random sample of 26,840 Zone A reenlistment decisions in FY 1980 through FY 1990.

Significantly smaller proportions of Marines are currently making reenlistment decisions at the rank of sergeant (and larger proportions at the rank of lance corporal) than were in the early 1980s. And, while the reenlistment rates each year show sharp differentiation within each grade, the reenlistment rates by grade have changed over the years. For FY 1980 through FY 1983 decisions, the reenlistment rates were 12.2 percent for lance corporals, 30.3 percent for corporals, and 40.6 percent for sergeants/staff sergeants; for FY 1984 through FY 1990 decisions, the reenlistment rates were 24.3 percent for lance corporals, 34.9 percent for corporals, and 49.2 percent for sergeants/staff sergeants. Thus, over the decade, reenlistment rates increased somewhat within each grade, with the rate for lance corporals effectively doubling.

The effects of grade on reenlistment timing (out-year versus in-year) are complicated. First, there are partly definitional effects because an earlier decision means there is less time for a promotion. Second, there is the strong tendency of Marines with five- or six-year initial contracts to reenlist out-year (these Marines have a higher grade distribution). The outcome of these two somewhat conflicting forces is that reenlistments of lance corporals and sergeants are more likely than average to be out-year reenlistments.

b. If missing AFQT categories are omitted, 32.9 percent of the individuals leaving were AFQT categories I and II (23.4/(100-28.8) and 27.2 percent of the reenlistees were AFQT categories I and II (21.4/(100-29.4).

The next category of variables summarizes marital and dependency statuses. The results support findings for other services (see [5]). Thus, while the findings in the table are not surprising, the authors are not aware of any previous analysis of Marine Corps retention that explicitly examined marital or dependency status. Reenlistment rates of Marines are sharply delineated by marital/dependency status: Marines who are married (or who have dependents) are considerably more likely to reenlist than those who are single. While only 24.8 percent of single Marines without dependents reenlist, 44.6 percent of married Marines reenlist. Although the proportion of single Marines with dependents is not large, almost half of these Marines reenlist. Marines with two or more dependents (regardless of marital status) were 13 percent of the population of recommended and eligible Marines; 49 percent of these Marines reenlist. Additionally, over the decade of the 1980s married Marines appear to be more likely than average to be out-year reenlisters. 1

The relationship between AFQT test score categories and the reenlistment/leave decision is complicated by the fact that accurate categories are missing for almost 30 percent of the Marines making these decisions in the 1980s. Generally, however, the high AFQT scorers (categories I and II) as well as HSDG Marines are slightly less likely than other Marines to reenlist. High AFQT score category recruits and HSDG recruits are, however, more likely to complete the first-term (not attrite) than are other recruits. Thus, these quality recruits are more heavily represented in the population making reenlistment decisions than they were in the initial recruit cohort. (See [3] for more discussion on this point.)

Other differences in reenlistment rates include higher rates for females, blacks, and those who executed an extension prior to the enlistment decision. For the MOS groupings, the reenlisters are less likely to be from infantry MOSs, and more likely to be from administrative MOSs, than are the individuals who separate.

^{1.} Analysis of more recent data, in particular the mix of in-year/out-year reenlistment decisions in FY 1989 does not show this pattern of married Marines being more likely than average to reenlist out-year. These findings are discussed later in the paper.

^{2.} Most of these extensions are very short. Executing an extension after the initial contract expired was considerably more common in the early 1980s than it has been recently. In FY 1989, for example, only 4 percent of recommended and eligible Marines executed extensions before making their leave/reenlist decision, whereas for the entire period, 11 percent of Marines executed an extension before making their final decision.

^{3.} Appendix B shows how the MOSs have been grouped into the seven large areas.

While tabulations of reenlistment rates by different characteristics of Marines making reenlistment decisions can provide considerable insight into the factors associated with the reenlistment decision, they can also obscure relationships important to Marine Corps planners. For example, there is virtually no difference in the average values of the pay index for Marines who reenlisted versus Marines who separated (1.17 versus 1.16). Yet virtually all reenlistment studies have found a strong relationship between pay indices and reenlistment rates (see [8 through 11]). To obtain valid estimates of the effects of particular variables on the reenlistment decision, a multivariate model must be estimated. Only in such a model can confounding effects be statistically separated.

Estimating the Reenlistment Probability: The Logit Equation

Each of the 26,840 Marines in our sample either reenlisted or separated from the Marine Corps. Thus, it is a dichotomous decision (reenlist, don't reenlist) that requires examination. One wants to restrict the estimating function to credible values (probabilities of reenlisting no smaller than zero or larger than one). A common functional form is a binomial logit (discussed in more detail in appendix D). Logit equations estimate gently sloped S-shaped curves between the probability bounds of zero and one. Figure 7 illustrates a logit curve.

The estimating equation is nonlinear and is estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.² The estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics indicate the direction and the strength of the statistical relationship. The coefficients are used to calculate the slopes (or derivatives) of the relationships or to estimate the reenlistment probabilities predicted by the equation for different categories of Marines.³

^{1.} The attempt with a multivariate model is to partition out the independent effects of grade, compensation, marital status, etc., on the reenlistment decision. Some characteristics, however, vary together. For example, Marines with longer initial enlistment contracts are more likely to be older, married, and of a higher grade at the first reenlistment decision point. If the characteristics are too highly intercorrelated, independent effects cannot be estimated. (Technically, this is called multicollinearity.) Fortunately, there is sufficient variation in the data to allow estimation.

^{2.} All estimation was done with the statistical package LIMDEP.

^{3.} Since the function is nonlinear, the value of the derivative depends on where it is evaluated. Most of the work in this paper evaluates the derivative at the mean of the data.




Figure 7. Example of a logit curve

LOGIT EQUATION ESTIMATES FOR REENLISTMENT DECISIONS: FY 1980 THROUGH FY 1990

The probability of reenlistment will be estimated as a function of the SRB bonus multiple (SRB_LEV), grade, background characteristics, the length of the initial contract, whether or not there was an extension immediately before to the decision, the MOS group, the pay index, and the civilian unemployment rate. Some specifications will omit the latter two variables (the pay index and the civilian unemployment rate) and substitute a set of fiscal year control variables. A fiscal year control variable will "pick up" any effects that are peculiar to the year; these include any changes in attitudes in addition to changes in pay and the civilian unemployment rate.

Finally, a variable called SRB_AFQT12 is included in the specifications. It is designed to capture any additional impact that SRBs may have on the reenlistment decisions for Marines testing in the top two categories of the AFQT (AFQT12 Marines). This variable assumes a value

^{1.} Estimating the equation with fiscal year control variables and either the pay index or the unemployment rate would confine the effects of pay and unemployment to effects within particular fiscal years. Since pay and unemployment vary little within particular years (and since the variation of interest is the change in these variables over the different years), the economic variables are not included in the equations that include fiscal year variables.

of one for each AFQT12 Marine who will receive an SRB if he reenlists; otherwise, the variable is zero.

Table 3 presents the logit coefficient estimates for the two basic specifications for the reenlistment equation. Specification 1 includes the pay index and civilian unemployment rate variables. Specification 2 omits these two variables and includes instead a set of control variables, one for each fiscal year.

The estimating equations fit the data extremely well. Coefficient estimates are statistically significant at very high levels (except for the Hispanic control variable, two MOS groups, and two of the fiscal year control variables). Additionally, the large chi-square statistics indicate very high levels of statistical significance for the entire equation. What, then, do these equations predict?

Overall, the results suggest that higher SRBs, higher grade, and longer initial enlistments are associated with higher reenlistment rates. Additionally, females, blacks, and married individuals are more likely to reenlist than other groups. Higher levels of the military-to-civilian pay (pay index) or higher civilian unemployment rates are additionally associated with higher reenlistment probabilities. AFQT12 Marines are less likely to reenlist, but for these Marines the SRB program provides an additional positive reenlistment inducement. 2

Next to the coefficient estimates for each specification, the derivative (calculated at the average reenlistment rate) is detailed. Derivatives provide the predicted change in the reenlistment rate for a small change in the variable. For example, both specifications suggest that a one-level increase in the bonus multiple (SRB_LEV) will raise the predicted reenlistment rate 6.6 percentage points (.066).

^{1.} Generally for categorical variables (for example, male versus female), one category needs to be omitted in order to estimate the equation. The coefficient estimates for the categorical variables are then interpreted as differences from the omitted category. Thus, for gender, the included variable is "male" and the estimated reenlistment effects for the variable are the differences in male relative to female retention behavior. Similarly, the estimates in table 3 omit a variable for FY 1990. Thus, the effects estimated for the different fiscal years should be understood as that year's impact, relative to the omitted year, FY 1990.

2. In another specification, the SRB level was also interacted with AFQT12. The results of this estimation, not reported, were similar to those reported in the text.

^{3.} Appendix E contains logit equation estimates similar to those in table 3, but with separate indicator variables for each SRB level.

 $\textbf{Table 3.} \quad \textbf{Logit coefficients and derivatives for reenlistment decisions,} \\ \textbf{FY 1980 through FY 1990}$

	_	Specification 1		Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
SRB_LEV	1.114	.301** (26.56)	.066	.302** (26.02)	.066	
SRB_AFQT12	.110	.177** (2.57)	.039	.193** (2.79)	. 042	
AFQT12	.227	204** (-3.75)	045	231** (-4.21)	051	
Cpl	.588	.642** (16.27)	.141	.648** (16.27)	. 142	
Sgt	.179	.989** (19.08)	.215	.973** (18.72)	.213	
SSgt	.003	2.134** (7.77)	.468	2.129** (7.67)	.467	
Married or dependents	.380	.831** (28.66)	.182	.828** (28.37)	.181	
Pay index	1.167	2.657 ** (8.20)	.582	No	No	
Civilian unemployment	.116	2.604 ** (4.19)	.571	No	No	
Length of first contract	3.807	.072* (2.17)	.016	.099** (2.89)	.022	
Prior extension	.110	.458** (10.30)	.100	.440** (9.81)	.096	
Male	.953	235** (-3.62)	052	228** (-3.49)	050	
HSDG	. 845	116** (-2.90)	025	109** (-2.72)	024	
Black	.180	1.066** (28.91)	. 234	1.072** (28.85)	. 235	

Table 3. (Continued)

		Specification 1		Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
Hispanic	.057	.116* (1.87)	.025	.140* (2.25)	.031	
Infantry	. 277	415** (-10.50)	091	440** (-11.03)	096	
Air mechanical, fixed-wing	.057	219** (-3.41)	048	242** (-3.75)	053	
Air mechanical, helicopter	.031	267** (-3.20)	059	306** (-3.65)	067	
Air, technical	.086	518 ** (-8.64)	114	542** (-8.99)	119	
Air, other	.039	059 (782)	013	075 (998)	016	
Other, technical	.097	095 (-1.75)	021	099 (-1.82)	022	
Administrative	.131	.441** (9.55)	.097	.433** (9.33)	.095	
FY 1980	.094	No	No	700** (-7.44)	153	
FY 1981	.090	No	No	252** (-2.75)	055	
FY 1982	.081	No	No	278** (-3.23)	061	
FY 1983	.084	No	No	.050 (.632)	.011	
FY 1984	.090	No	No	.286** (3.80)	.063	
FY 1985	.095	No	No	006 (077)	001	

Table 3. (Continued)

		Specification 1		Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
FY 1986	.106	No	No	.352** (4.86)	.077	
FY 1987	.100	No	No	.261** (3.57)	.057	
FY 1988	.105	No	No	394** (-5.25)	086	
FY 1989	.088	No	No	206** (-2.71)	045	
AFQT missing	. 290	.173** (3.35)	.038	.273** (4.90)	.060	
Constant	1.000	-5.573** (-13.52)		-2.226** (-13.22)		
Chi square		4,478.4 4,728.0		28.0		
Number of observations	•	26,	840	26,840		

NOTES: (1) The number in parentheses beneath each coefficient is an asymptotic t-statistic.

Many of the explanatory variables in table 3 are indicator variables that assume the value of 1 if the Marine is in the appropriate category (AFQT12, Cpl, Sgt, SSgt, etc.). As above, the derivatives for these variables can be used to estimate changes in the reenlistment rate for small changes in the variables (for example, seeing how the reenlistment rate would be expected to change if the proportion married increased by .10). Probably, however, the effects of these variables are more easily captured in tables that contain estimated reenlistment

^{(2) **} Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-percent level (two-tailed test).

^{(3) *} Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5-percent level (two-tailed test).

probabilities for Marines with different characteristics. 1 These tables will be detailed later in the paper.

Attempts were made to verify the basic model for individual MOSs. Appendix F contains estimates for eight different MOSs, six for which the sample contained sufficient numbers of observations for model estimation and two (MOSs 0231 and 0431) for which it was necessary to extract all zone A decisions from the 225,000-decision database before estimation could be done. The results for the individual MOSs confirm the findings reported in table 3 for the aggregate model, although there are clearly some differences by MOS.

The Relationships Between Reenlistments, Pay, and Unemployment

Higher levels of military pay relative to civilian pay or of the civilian unemployment rate increase Marine Corps enlistments. An increase of 1 percentage point in either of these variables is associated, on average, with an increase of about 0.6 percentage point on the overall reenlistment rate. While table 3 reports these derivatives, the effects can also be reported as elasticities. In fact, the effect of pay on reenlistments is frequently reported as a reenlistment elasticity. The elasticity is the percentage change in the reenlistment rate that can be expected from a 1-percent change in the pay index. (Note that elasticities are not percentage points.) The pay elasticity derived from the estimates in table 3 is 2.1, meaning that a 1-percent increase in the pay index is associated with a 2.1-percent increase in the reenlistment rate: similarly, a 1-percent decrease in the pay index would, other things equal, be associated with a 2.1-percent decrease in the reenlistment rate. This responsiveness of Marine Corps reenlistments to changes in the ratio of military-to-civilian pay is well in line with those reported in other studies (see [1] for a good summary of earlier work).

The average value for the 20- to 24-year-old male unemployment rate over the time period is .116 (or, as it is usually reported, an

^{1.} The derivatives should be understood as the estimated change in the reenlistment rate for a small change in the indicator variable. For example, the estimated grade effects are all relative to the omitted grade of lance corporal. The derivative for the variable corporal is .141. Incrementing the variable corporal by .10 (effectively enriching the grade structure of the population making reenlistment decisions by increasing the number of corporals and decreasing the number of lance corporals) is estimated to change the average reenlistment rate by .014 (from .324 to .338).

^{2.} These elasticities are calculated at the average reenlistment rate of .32 and at the average value of the pay index of 1.17. For example, a 1-percent increase in pay would raise the pay index to 1.18 (1.17 times 1.01) and would be associated with an increase in the reenlistment rate to .33 (1.021 times .32).

11.6 percent unemployment rate). The reported derivative is .571, suggesting that an increase in the unemployment rate from .116 to .126 would be associated with an increase in the average reenlistment rate of a little over half a percentage point. This effect should be evaluated in terms of what are common percentage changes in the unemployment rate for 20- to 24-year-old males (see figure 5). Young male unemployment rates are quite volatile. During the period of this analysis, the rate varied from 7.5 to 18.0--an 11.5-percentage-point range.

SRB Estimates: Differential Effects for AFQT12 Category Marines

SRB bonuses have been very effective in targeting Marine Corps reenlistments. Table 3 showed an average impact of over 6 percentage points in the reenlistment rate for an increase of one in the bonus level.² These bonuses, however, have had an additional impact on the reenlistment decisions of Marines who scored in categories I and II on the AFQT. On average, the additional impact of having an SRB (versus no SRB) for an AFQT12 Marine is an increase of 3 percentage points in the reenlistment rate. That these bonuses additionally affect on the reenlistment decision of these Marines is probably not surprising, since these Marines, on average, are probably offered better opportunities in the civilian sector than are Marines with lower AFQT scores.

Table 4 shows reenlistment rates predicted by the logit equations. These predicted reenlistment rates are for Marines who were average in all characteristics (except AFQT category and the bonus level). The predictions show reenlistment rates for AFQT12 Marines with no SRB to be about 4 percentage points lower than the reenlistment rates for other Marines with no SRB. Thus, table 4 shows predicted reenlistment rates for Marines without an SRB of .18 for AFQT12 scorers and .22 for other Marines (AFQT3A-4 scorers). When there is an SRB, differences in the predicted reenlistment rates narrow to 1 percentage point. In brief, the average additional reenlistment impact of the bonus is larger for Marines who score higher on the AFQT.

Table 4 also illustrates the predictions for MOS 0231, Intelligence Specialist. Almost half of the Marines in MOS 0231 making reenlistment decisions in FY 1980 through FY 1990 tested in AFQT category I or II.

^{1.} It is easier to get maximum likelihood techniques to converge if the explanatory variables are all of about the same order of magnitude. Thus, the unemployment rate was divided by 100 (11.6/100-.116).

^{2.} The derivative for the SRB-multiple variable (called SRB_LEV) is 0.066.

^{3.} The average bonus level for all reenlistment decisions between FY 1980 and June 1990 was 1.1. The average level for Marines in MOSs that offered an SRB was 2.5.

^{4.} To obtain sufficient numbers of observations for this MOS, all Marines making Zone A reenlistment decisions in this MOS were analyzed (453 Marines).

In this period, SRB levels were 0, 1, 3, 4, and 5. For this MOS, the impact of differential impact of SRBs for AFQT category I and II Marines is much stronger than it is for the entire Marine Corps. Predicted reenlistment rates differ by over 20 percentage points without an SRB, but narrow to only 1 percentage point with positive bonus levels.

Table 4. Reenlistment rates predicted by logit equations: The effect of SRBs

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			SRB	leve1	-	
	None	1	2	3	4	5	6 ^a
All observations ^b							
AFQT12	.18	. 28	.35	.40	.48	. 50	.60
AFQT IIIA-IV	.22	.29	.35 .36	.40 .41	.49	.51	.61
MOS 0231 ^a							
AFQT12	.21	.65	ъ	.62	. 58	.78	
AFQT IIIA-IV	.44	.64	ъ	.61	. 57	.77	

a. No level-six bonuses have been offered by the Marine Corps since 1983, and there were no level-two or level-six SRB levels in MOS 0231 between FY 1980 and FY 1990.

Predicted Reenlistment Rates by Marital and Dependency Status

Marital and dependency statuses were entered in logit equations with various definitions (the other explanatory variables were identical to those shown in table 3, specification 2). From these estimates, predicted reenlistment probabilities were calculated by grade and marital status. These probabilities, illustrated in table 5, are for Marines who are average in all characteristics except marital status and grade (which are varied in the table). The resulting predicted reenlistment probabilities by marital and dependency statuses reinforce the tabulations by marital/dependency statuses reported earlier in table 2. For example, corporals, average in all characteristics except marital status, are predicted to reenlist at the rate of 26 percent if they are single, at a rate of 43 percent if they are married or have dependents, and at rate of 47 percent if they have two or more dependents.

b. Reenlistment rate predictions hold all characteristics not identified in the table at their average values. The estimates for all observations come from the logit detailed in table E-1 (first column). The logit for Intelligence Specialist (MOS 0231) is detailed in table F-1 (first column).

Table 5. Reenlistment rates predicted from logit equations: The effect of marital/dependency status

		Grade ^a	
	LCp1	Cpl	Sgt
Average in all characteristics			
except			
Single	0.15	0.26	0.32
Married	0.28	0.43	0.51
Married or with dependents	0.28	0.43	0.51
Single with dependents	0.29	0.44	0.52
Any marital status; with two or more dependents	0.32	0.47	0.55

a. The number of E6s was not sufficient (less than 50) for prediction.

DECISIONS IN FY 1988 THROUGH FY 1990

Having reenlistment information for over a decade permits fairly precise estimates of the average effect of changes in the SRB level, the civilian unemployment rate, the pay index, an so forth. Still, to the extent it is possible to isolate any recent deviation in reenlistment behavior from the average behavior over the last decade, it is important to do so. Thus, this section will examine recent patterns, attempting to identify any deviations from average behavior observed during the past decade.

Table 6 details the number and characteristics of recommended and eligible Marines making recent zone A reenlistment decisions. While table 2 presented similar tabulations for a sample of decisions from FY 1980 through June 1990, the tabulations in table 6 include all zone A FY 1988 through FY 1990 reenlistment decisions for Marines whose initial enlistment contracts were four, five, or six years. Generally, the

^{1.} Indeed, time periods of one or two years do not provide sufficient variation in some variables--particularly the pay index and the civilian unemployment rate--to permit any estimation of their effects.

^{2.} A small number of records contained implausible data for some of the variables; these records were not included.

relationships among characteristics of Marines and reenlistment propensities in FY 1988 through FY 1990 appear similar to those discussed for the sample of decisions over the last decade.

Table 6, however, contains some new information. These are the first years that any sizable number of Marines with five- or six-year contracts are making decisions. Marines with five- or six-year initial enlistment contracts will constitute about one-quarter of FY 1991 and following fiscal years' zone A populations, and it is important to obtain early estimates of any differences in their reenlistment patterns. Table 6 shows substantially higher reenlistment rates for Marines with longer initial contracts.

Additionally, there appears to have been a recent *increase* in the propensity of high AFQT-scoring Marines to reenlist. FY 1988 illustrates the traditional pattern observed over the decade of the 1980s (slightly lower than average reenlistment rates for AFQT12 scoring Marines (21.0 versus 25.2 percent)). In both 1989 and 1990, however, the reenlistment rates of both AFQT12 and AFQT13A Marines is *higher* than the overall reenlistment rate. In 1990, for example, the overall reenlistment rate was 24.9 percent, and the reenlistment rate for AFQT12 Marines was 25.7 percent.

Since the first-term attrition rates of Marines who score high on the AFQT is lower than the average attrition rate, these Marines are more likely than average to complete the enlistment term and be part of the population making a reenlistment decision. If, additionally, they continue to reenlist at a higher than average rate, then the proportion of AFQT12 Marines in the second-term will be larger than it was for the original accession cohort. Accession quality is thus of critical importance, shaping the future quality of the career force as well as the quality of the first-term force.

Estimating Reenlistments in FY 1988 Through FY 1990

Table 7 details the reenlistment estimates for the FY 1988 through FY 1990 period. No estimates were made for the current impact of the pay index or the civilian unemployment rate because of insufficient variation in these variables over this short period.

^{1.} The decision to include a separate analysis of recent reenlistment decision was made after the main analytic work was completed. Recent SRB messages have predicated SRB eligibility sometimes on both PMOS and additional MOS (AMOS). Because the basic data were drawn from the ARSTAT file and because this file contains no information on AMOS, the information in table 6 on the number of Marines who were offered SRBs is incomplete. In particular, the table misses Marines who were offered an SRB because of their AMOS. Future work will have to match records to other files to obtain information on each Marine's AMOS.

Table 6. Reenlistment rates, by characteristics of recommended and eligible Marines making Zone A reenlistment decisions in FY 1988, FY 1989, and FY 1990

	FY 1	988	FY 1	.989	FY 1	990
Variables	Number	Reen.	Number	Reen. rate	Number	Reen. rate
		<u> </u>				
Overall	19,255	25.2	16,235	27.6	15,352	24.9
SRB offered						
No SRB	8,875	14.3		25.0	13,453	21.7
SRB level one	848	32.4	3,473	22.8	390	33.6
SRB level two	4,508	28.2	1,000	33.8	223	39.5
SRB level three	1,190	36.3	1,075	34.0	274	46.0
SRB level four	3,514	41.0	1,986		722	54.2
SRB level five	320	52.8	73	27.4	290	56.9
Grade						
E3	5,992	23.9	•	20.1	3,326	21.7
E4	11,968	25.4	•		10,691	24.8
E5/6	1,121	34.7	1,058	47.5	1,192	44.7
Length initial contract						
Four years ·	19,117	25.1	15,760	26.7	14,220	23.5
Five years	2		43	69.8	156	36.5
Six years	134	41.8	432	56.3	976	43.6
Marital/dependency status						
Not married, no dependents	11,659	20.2	9,403	20.8	8,769	18.7
Not married, with dependents	504	32.5	482	37.8	472	31.4
Married	7,092	33.1	6,350	36.8	6,111	33.3
Either married or with dependents	7,596	33.0	6,832	36.9	6,583	33.2
Two or more dependents	2,476	35.9	2,615	38.9	2,583	36.6
Other individual background characteristics						
Male	18,422	24.8	15,502	27.2	14,644	24.3
Female	833	35.9	733	35.2	708	36.2
Black	3,192	43.0	2,907	42.7	2,601	38.4
Hispanic	968	24.7	830	31.7	994	23.3
Not black or hispanic	15,095	21.5	12,499	23.8	11,757	22.0
HSDG	17,344	25.2	14,764	27.6	14,227	24.9
CERT	1,723	26.3	1,329	29.0	1,024	26.0
Non-HSDG	188	17.0	142	13.4	101	14.9
AFQT 12	6,270	21.0	4,964	27.8	5,548	25.7
AFQT 13A	10,626	22.4	8,644	27.0	9,310	25.2
	10,020	22.4	0,044	27.0	9,510	43.2

Table 7. Logit coefficients and derivatives for reenlistment decisions, FY 1988 through FY 1990

		Specific	ation 1	Specific	ation 2
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative
SRB_LEV	1.04	.318** (42.3)	.063	.328** (43.89)	.064
HSDG	.911	.001 (.04)	.000	.010 (.27)	.002
AFQT12	.320	140** (-5.50)	028	072** (-2.87)	014
Cp1	.658	.353** (13.64)	.069	No	••
Sgt/SSgt	.079	.996** (21.87)	.196	No	
Married or dependents	.419	.711** (33.79)	.140	.731** (34.93)	.144
Five-year obligor	.004	.788 ** (5.09)	.155	.860** (5.65)	.169
Six-year obligor	.030	.303 ** (4.77)	.060	.752** (13.09)	.148
Prior extension ^a	.040	.407 ** (8.10)	.080	.612** (12.49)	.120
Male	.955	021 (45)	004	050 (-1.06)	010
Black	.176	.903** (34.19)	.177	.866 ** (33.04)	.170
Hispanic	.055	.207 ** (4.53)	.041	.199 ** (4.38)	.039
Number of observations ^b		53	,919	53,	919
Chi-square		6,9	96.4	6,4	98.4

NOTE: (1) Number in parentheses beneath coefficients are t-statistics.

- (2) ** Statistical significance at the 1-percent level.
- (3) Logit equations also contained fiscal year indicator, missing AFQT score indicator, and MOS category variables.
- a. All extensions before the reenlistment decision were made by Marines with initial obligations of four years.
- b. This data set contains all zone A decisions for Marines with initial obligations of four, five, or six years. A small number of observations with missing or implausible data were dropped from the analysis.

The strong reenlistment incentives provided by SRB bonus multiples are again shown in table 7. Estimated derivatives show that each unit increment in the bonus level is associated with an increase in the reenlistment rate of about 6 percentage points.

The next two variables (HSDG and AFQT12) showed statistically significant negative impacts—other things equal—on reenlistment probabilities in the 1980s; the magnitudes were about 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively (see table 3). Holding "everything else equal," however, is probably not particularly meaningful for these particular characteristics. For example, Marines who are high test scorers are more likely to be in higher grades and in longer enlistment contracts, characteristics that are both associated with higher reenlistment propensities. Table 2, in fact, showed average reenlistment rates over the decade of the 1980s of 30.5 percent for AFQT12 Marines and 31.1 for HSDG Marines (versus 32.4 percent for the overall sample). These differences in average reenlistment rates are considerably smaller than the differences "everything else equal."

Data in table 6 showed that in FY 1989 and FY 1990 the reenlistment rate of AFQT12 Marines was actually slightly higher than average. The estimation results in table 7 for these recent reenlistment decisions show the variable HSDG is no longer statistically significant. The impact of the AFQT12 variable, although still statistically significant, is smaller than it was in an earlier period. Thus, holding all other characteristics constant, Marines scoring in categories I and II of the AFQT are still somewhat less likely to reenlist than lower scoring Marines. Given the average characteristics of AFQT12 Marines, however,

^{1.} For example, holding all other variables constant (other things equal) looks at the effect of AFQT12 Marines within grade, length of initial contract, etc.

AFQT12 Marines are now slightly more likely to reenlist than are Marines scoring lower on the AFQT.

Marines who are married or who have dependents are also still considerably more likely to reenlist than are single Marines without dependents. In the current period it is not nearly as common to execute an extension before the final decision to reenlist or to separate from the Marine Corps. Those who do first execute an extension, however, still seem to be signaling more positive reenlistment propensities than those who have not yet made any decision.

Both specifications in table 7 include indicator variables for five- and six-year initial obligations; the two specifications in the table differ because the second specification excludes separate variables for grade (longer initial obligations imply a higher grade at the decision point.) Considering the grade at which Marines make their decision (the first specification), five-year obligors are considerably more likely, and six-year obligors more likely, to reenlist than four-year obligors. When grade is omitted (the second specification) and the initial enlistment length (as well as the other variables in the equation that predict grade--AFQT category, MOS group, etc.) is allowed to proxy the effects of grade, both five- and six-year obligors are considerably more likely to reenlist than are Marines with initial obligations of four years.²

Overall, the Marine Corps should expect that these longer obligations increase the probabilities of reenlistment. These longer initial enlistments also increase the probability that zone A reenlisters will be married and in higher grades when they make their reenlistment decision. 3

Table 8 provides additional information about FY 1989 and FY 1990 decisions for Marines of different initial contract lengths. For this period, there are large differences in reenlistment rates by length of initial contract. There are also sharp differences in the proportion married. Most of this difference in the marriage rate at the reenlistment point is due to age differences (for example, six-year personnel were 25.6 years of age at the decision point, while four-year personnel

^{1.} The specifications in table 7 identify these effects by the variable "married or dependents." Other logit equations, not reproduced in the paper, used all the variable definitions reported in table 5. Results for the current period are virtually identical to those found for the entire decade.

^{2.} Both the five- and six-year obligor variables need to be interpreted in relation to the omitted group, four-year obligors.

^{3.} Forthcoming work will attempt to examine all dimensions of initial enlistment contract lengths--recruitment and training costs, first-term attrition, reenlistment behavior, etc.

Table 8. First-term recommended and eligible population: statistics, by length of initial contract for FY 1989 and FY 1990

		FY 1990	990			FY 1989	989	
	4-year	5-year 6-year	6-year	5- and 6-year	4-year	5-year	6-year	5- and 6-year
Reenlistment percent	23.5	36.5	43.6	42.6	26.7	8.69	56.3	57.5
Percent of recommended and eligible population that were	38.5	ħ.6#	56.9	55.8	38.5	60.5	57.9	58.1
Rank LCpl Cpl Sgt	23.4 73.6 3.0	13.5 71.0 14.5	1.9 21.9 76.2	3.4 28.7 67.9	22.8 72.6 4.6	79.1	1.4 22.7 75.9	1.3 27.8 70.9
AFQT category I-II	32.4	48.1	89.5	71.1	29.0	41.9	88.9	94.6
AFQT category 1-IIIA	58.0	69.2	97.5	9.62	52.1	58.1	96.1	95.6
Number of Marines ^a	14,220	156	916	1,332	15,633	£#	432	ħ / ħ

a. Includes all recommended and eligible Zone A decisions for Marines with initial contracts of four, five, and six years. In FY 1990, five Marines (in FY 1989, six Marines) made their reenlistment decisions at the grade of SSgt; they were grouped with Sgts in the table.

were 23.6 years); since a six-year contract is two years longer than a four-year contract, these age differences (and thus the differences in the marriage rate) can be expected to persist.

The current sharp differences in grade at the first reenlistment point (the majority of four-year obligors are corporals, and the majority of six-year obligors are sergeants) probably will be reduced in the future because of changes in Marine Corps promotion policy. Since grade is such an important determinant of reenlistment probability, a reduction in the 20-percentage point difference in reenlistment rates for Marines with four-year versus five- or six-year initial contracts should be anticipated.

Finally, table 8 shows sharp differences between Marines with different obligation lengths in the proportion who test in AFQT categories I and II. Since AFQT scores are known at accession, future differences in AFQT scores at the first-term reenlistment point can be estimated with reasonable precision. An examination of AFQT category and contract length for accessions since FY 1985 shows that there will continue to be large differences in the proportion of AFQT category I and II Marines represented in the different contract length populations. However, the differences will not be quite as dramatic as those shown in table 8.

OUT-YEAR VERSUS IN-YEAR REENLISTMENTS

Two separate analyses were undertaken to examine possible differences in responses for out-year versus in-year reenlistments. The first analysis restricted the sample to reenlistments and estimated the probability that the reenlistment would be out-year. Thus, this analysis examines the timing of reenlistments. The second analysis dropped any out-year reenlisters from the data set and estimated the probability of reenlistment (reenlist within fiscal year or separate). The analyses were restricted to FY 1989 decisions, because historical information on policies regarding early reenlistment was not available. Appendix G contains these estimates.

The basic findings for the first analysis are that Marines with longer initial contracts and high AFQT scores are more likely to be outyear reenlisters than in-year reenlisters. Higher SRB levels induce

^{1.} They cannot be estimated exactly because the recommended and eligible population at the reenlistment point is a subset of the accession population four to six years earlier.

^{2.} FY 1990 decisions were not analyzed because they may have been affected by Operation Desert Shield, which began on 8 August 1990. Since out-year reenlistments are more likely at the end of the fiscal year, any change in behavior because of the operation could skew the relationships among out-year versus in-year reenlistments for FY 1990.

out-year reenlistments. Additionally, proportionally fewer of the reenlistments for black Marines are out-year than for the other racial/ethnic groups. For other characteristics, in FY 1989 at least, Marines appear to reenlist in roughly the same mix of out-year and in-year reenlistments as is average for the Corps.

The second analysis omitted out-year reenlistments, estimating for FY 1989 decisions the probability of an in-year reenlistment (versus a separation). This examination shows that the reenlistment inducements provided by SRBs are much smaller for in-year reenlistments than they are for all reenlistments. These findings suggest considerable caution in utilizing estimates for SRBs derived from all reenlistments to predict the impact of SRBs on in-year reenlistments. Higher SRB levels are considerably more powerful in buying the Marine Corps additional out-year reenlistments than they are for buying additional in-year reenlistments. If planners are required to predict in-year reenlistments accurately, additional work on modeling in-year reenlistments may be warranted. In particular, other things equal, if there are large numbers of out-year reenlistments in one particular year, the number of in-year reenlistments the next year will be smaller. In brief, future work should explicitly address how the number of out-year reenlistments last year affects the number of in-year reenlistments this year.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has analyzed Zone A reenlistment decisions by "recommended and eligible" Marines in the 1980s. During the decade, the characteristics of Marines making this reenlistment decision have changed substantially. In particular, recommended and eligible Marines currently making the decision are more likely to be (1) higher test scorers and better educated, (2) married or with dependents, (3) at a lower grade, and (4) finishing longer initial contracts than were comparable Marines in the early 1980s. One important objective of this study was to quantify differences in reenlistment behavior related to these differences in characteristics.

Reenlistment probability was estimated as a function of the SRB bonus multiple, grade, background characteristics, the length of the initial contract, whether or not an extension was executed immediately before the decision, the MOS group, a civilian-to-military pay index, and the civilian unemployment rate. The estimating equations fit the data extremely well, and coefficient estimates achieved high levels of statistical significance.

^{1.} The patterns of *out-year* reenlistments by grade are quite complex. First, early reenlisters, holding initial contract length constant, have been in the Marine Corps a shorter period of time when they reenlist. Second, Marines with longer initial enlistment contracts are more likely to reenlist out-year.

Overall, the results suggest that higher SRBs, higher grade, and longer initial enlistments are associated with higher reenlistment rates. Additionally, females, blacks, and married individuals are more likely to reenlist than other groups. Higher SRB levels appear to affect both the quantity and the quality of reenlistments as higher SRB levels appear particularly attractive to high quality Marines, thereby inducing disproportionate numbers of reenlistments from this group.

In each year of the 1980s, reenlistment rates were sharply delineated by grade, with the lowest rates for lance corporals and the highest rates for sergeants/staff sergeants. Over the decade, however, as promotion rates slowed, there were some changes in the reenlistment rates by grade. Although the reenlistment rates by grade increased for all grades, the increase in the lance corporal reenlistment rate was the largest. Presumably, making the reenlistment decision at the grade of lance corporal at the end of the decade had a more positive connotation about a successful first term of service than it had had at the beginning of the decade.

The relationship between AFQT score categories at accession and after the first reenlistment is a subject of considerable interest. The 1980s saw substantial increases in the proportion of Marine Corps accessions with high AFQT scores. These Marines with high test scores have lower first-term attrition and are thus more likely to be in the population of recommended and eligible Marines making reenlistment decisions. While most of the decade saw slightly lower than average reenlistment rates among AFQT category I-II Marines, the reenlistment rates in FY 1989 and FY 1990 of these Marines with very high test scores was higher than average. The last big increase in accession quality was in FY 1986, and it is these Marines that are now making reenlistment decisions. It appears that the Marine Corps investments in improving accession quality are paying off in higher retention as well as in better performance and lower first-term attrition.

While the Marine Corps can use its SRB budget to channel reenlistments to required personnel, it has considerably less ability to manipulate the relationship of military to civilian pay or the civilian unemployment rate. Yet, both of these factors have played important roles in the reenlistment equation, particularly in the early 1980s. A 1-percentage point increase in the CNA-constructed pay index for first-term personnel was associated with a 0.6-percentage point increase in the reenlistment rate. Similarly, a 1-percentage point increase in the 20-to 24-year-old male unemployment rate (a fairly small historical change) was associated with a 0.6-percentage point increase in the Marine Corps reenlistment rate.

Further analysis partitioned reenlistment decisions into those made before the fiscal year of contract expiration (out-year reenlistments) and those made in-year. It is especially important that Marine Corps planners project in-year reenlistments accurately, as these in-year

reenlistments directly affect year-end strength. Findings suggest that in-year reenlistments are not quite as responsive to SRBs as are out-year reenlistments. Additional work on the determinants of in-year reenlistments may be warranted.

Finally, during the course of the study, a permanent longitudinal decision database was constructed. Additionally, computer programs to extract desired decisions were finalized. Thus, future retention analyses can extract decisions, and the background information on Marines making these decisions, in a time frame that lags real-time decisions by only about three months.

REFERENCES

- [1] CNA Research Contribution 326, Profile of a Successful Marine, by William H. Sims, Sep 1977
- [2] CNA Research Memorandum 89-314, Identifying Successful Marine Corps Recruits, by Aline O. Quester, James H. North, and Theresa H. Kimble, Apr 1990
- [3] CNA Research Memorandum 90-62, Length of Time in Delayed-Entry Program and Its Effect on Marine Corp First-Term Survival, by James H. North, Sep 1990
- [4] CNA Research Memorandum 90-182, Validation of ASVAB Against Infantry Job Performance, by Paul W. Mayberry, Dec 1990
- [5] CNA Research Memorandum 91-53, Marriage and Dependency Rates for Enlisted Marines by Adebayo Adedeji, forthcoming
- [6] CNA Research Memorandum 91-160, Time in Grade: A Historical Summary for Enlisted Marine Corps Promotions From FY 1979 Through FY 1990, by Greg W. Steadman and Aline O. Quester, forthcoming
- [7] CNA Information Memorandum 127, CNA's Longitudinal ARSTAT Tracking Files for Enlisted Marines, by Greg W. Steadman, Apr 1991
- [8] Rand Corporation, R-1935-ARPA, Reenlistment Bonuses and First-Term Retention, by John H. Enns, Sep 1977
- [9] CNA Research Contribution 476, Determinants of Navy Reenlistment and Extension Rates, by Matthew S. Goldberg and John T. Warner, Dec 1982
- [10] CNA Research Memorandum 87-43, The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses on Retention, by Donald J. Cymrot, Mar 1987
- [11] CNA Report 138, The Retention Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses in the United States Marine Corps, by Donald J. Cymrot, Aug 1987
- [12] Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
 Military Compensation Background Papers: Compensation Elements
 and their Related Manpower Costs, 3rd ed. Chapter II, p. 35,
 Jun 1987
- [13] United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News: Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers, published quarterly, various issues

APPENDIX A

VARIABLES ON THE RETENTION DATABASE

APPENDIX A

VARIABLES ON THE RETENTION DATABASE

This appendix describes the variables on the retention database in more detail than is provided in the main text.

Figure A-1 illustrates the process by which the data were prepared. To facilitate future analysis, the data were prepared generically; only on the final computer programs are the data restricted to zone A decisions. There are three computer programs (shown as rectangles on the figure). In turn, these programs

- Append correctly normed AFQT scores to the data
- Construct a retention database organized around decisions (reenlistments, effective extensions, and separations)
- Extract records for zone A decisions of reenlistments, extensions of one year or longer, and separations of Marines recommended and eligible for reenlistment, and append additional information to the record.




Figure A-1. Flow diagram describing construction of zone A retention database

The first step was to append correctly calibrated AFQT scores to the ARSTAT longitudinal tracking file because the AFQT score recorded on the Marine's personnel records may be misnormed. Previous work had derived accurate AFQT categories for accessions since FY 1978, and thus the first step was to match this accession cohort file to the longitudinal ARSTAT Tracking file and append correctly normed AFQT score categories to the longitudinal histories. (The resulting data set is called ARST-LONG-9006.DAT on figure A-1.)

The next step was the construction of a retention database (called ARST-RETEN-9006.DAT and stored on computer tape). This database integrates historical information from the individuals's ARSTAT longitudinal history to a reenlistment, extension, or leave decision. This database will be permanently maintained by CNA and should form the basis for future retention analysis.

A particular Marine may have more than one record in this database, since each observation is a decision. For each decision, the following information is either extracted or constructed from the individual's ARSTAT longitudinal record:

• Background

- SSN
- Gender
- Race/ethnic background
- AFQT score category
- Education (years and category)
- Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date

^{1.} There have been several problems historically with incorrectly calibrated AFQT scores. CNA has done extensive work with AFQT norming and has developed algorithms to place individuals in the correct AFQT categories. (See conversion tables in Department of Defense, DOD 1304.12WI, Conversion Tables Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, Jan 1989.) Considerable information is required to calculate accurate scores (the test date, the ASVAB battery, raw scores, etc.) and for accessions before the late 1970s, and it is generally not possible to calculate accurate scores.

^{2.} For accessions before FY 1978, and for some accessions since FY 1978 with incomplete information, correctly normed AFQT score categories are missing. Rather than use inaccurate scores, the analysis will explicitly recognize the missing information and statistically control for it.

• Information at decision point

- Decision type (reenlistment; extension; separation, eligible at EAS; separation, ineligible at EAS; separation, eligible and not at EAS; separation, ineligible and not at EAS; broken reenlistment)
- Component code
- Age
- Marital and dependent statuses
- MCC and RUC
- 4 PMOS
- Present grade
- Time spent in present grade
- Decision date
- Months of service at decision
- Number of extensions immediately before reenlistment, extension, or separation
- Length of all extensions before this contract
- Length of prior enlistment contract
- End of active service (EAS) date on prior contract
- Months between EAS on prior contract and decision date
- Flag if decision fiscal year is before the fiscal year of the EAS for the prior contract
- For broken reenlistment, number of months between separation and reentry

• Characteristics of decision

- Length of reenlistment or extension
- Separation designator number (SDN) for separation

• Longitudinal history of grade changes

- Months to promotion (E2-E3, E3-E4, E4-E5, E5-E6)
- Demotions total
- Number of demotions in the 12 months before the particular decision.

The final step was to extract zone A decisions (to reenlist, to extend for at least one year, or to separate with a status of recommended and eligible for reenlistment) from the retention database. Additionally, this computer program appended information that characterized the environment at the time the Marine made the reenlistment decision—the level of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) for the Marine's PMOS at the decision, the civilian unemployment rate for 20-to 24-year—old males, and an index of military—to—civilian pay. Because CNA has been unable to locate information on SRB bonus multiples for either FY 1978 or FY 1979, the Zone A reenlistment database begins in FY 1980.

APPENDIX B

PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CODES

APPENDIX B

PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CODES

This appendix provides two tables. Table B-1 is the grouping of PMOSs into the categories used in the logit retention equations. Table B-2 is a listing, by PMOS, of the numbers of decisions for the random sample in the FY 1980 through June 1990 period (26,840 decisions).

AIRMF (Air Mechanical Flued-wing)

	6600 BASIC AFRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MARINE	 FT MECHANIC	AIRCRAFT MECHANIC	* MECIANIC	AIRCRAFT	ABLE ADDERT LECTALLO 2016	AIRCRAFT	A I RCRAFT	AIRCRAFT POWER PLANIS MECHANIC	I POWER PLANTS MECHANIC J-79	6026 AIRCRAFT POWER PLANTS MECHANIC ROLLS ROYCE PEGASUS	AIRCRAFI	AIRCRAFT	A I RCRAFT	6035 AIRCRAFT POWER PLANI TEST CELL OPER FXD WAG . 6043 AIRCRAFT WELDER	AIRCRAFT	A I RCRAFT A	AIRCRAFT	6046 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COMPUTE SYS ANALY/OPER	AIRCRAFT HYDRI IC/PRESSIC		AIRCRAFT HYDRE IC/PHENMIC	AIRCRAFT HYDRI IC/PHEUMIC	AIRCRAFT HYDRLIC/PHEUMIC	AIRCRAFT HYDRI IC/PHEUMIC	A PRCHAF I	BECOM AIRCRAFT AIRFRAMES MAINT CHIEF	A I RCRAFT	-	60/3 AIRCRAFT WAINT GSE ELECT/REFRIGERATION MECHANIC	-	AIRCRAFT SAFETY EQUIP MECHILC	AIRCRAFT SAFETY COULD	6005 AIRCRAFT SAFETY EQUIP MECINIC 1-4/X7-4	AIRCRAFT SAFETY	AIRCRAFT SAFETY EQUIP MECHAIC	A I INCRAFT	6000 AIRCRAFT SAFETY EQUIP CHIEF 6001 AIRCRAFT STRIFTINGE MECHANIC TOAINER	A I RCRAF 1	A I RCRAFT	AIRCRAFT SIRUCTURES MECHANIC	6095 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES MECHANIC AV-8/1AV-8	AIRCRAFT SIMUCIUMES	AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES MECHANIC	
INFAURY	8108 BASIC HIFAHTRY MAN	LAV CREMAN			0352 GURRER PRAVI MACHINECON	2	ANTITANK ASSAULT	INFANIRY UNIT LE		OBI) FIELD ARTHLERY LAWYONEEN DAILS FIELD ARTHLERY NUCLEAR PROJECTILEMAN	FIETO ARTHLERY	FIELD ARTILLERY		FIELD ARTICLERY	1886 BASIC TANK AND ASSAULT AND HIBIAN CREMMAN	MEBAT TANK CREW	_		SCUBA MARINE (OFFICE/FRE) PABACHILLST/SCUBA MARINE	SOSS PARALIMITATION SOCIALIST (OFFICER: 4)/ENLISTED)	GROUND SMILLI GLEGORIES			AIPMI (Air Mechanical helos)	HE1.1COP1ER	HELICOPTER MECH	6113 HELICOPIER MECHANIC CH-53	HE I ICOP IER	HELICOPIER MAIN	6122 HELICOPTER POWER PLANTS MACHANIC 1-58	HELICOPIER POWER PLANTS MECHANIC	HEL ICOPTER DYNA	AIRCRAFI PO	6142 HELICOPIER STRECTURES MECHANIC CH-46 6143 HELICOPIER STRECTURES MECHANIC CL-54	HELLICOPTER		HEI ICOPTER HYDRI IC/PHETMIC MECHANIC		6155 WELLCOTTEN MONETC/PREDMIC MECHANIC CH-55E 6159 WELLCOTTER AIRFRANES MAINT CHIFF	PRESIDENTIAL SU	HELICOPTER CREW CHIEF			HELICOPIER CREW CHIEF	

чесн	2821 COMPUTER TECHNICIAN
M BASIC AVIONICS MARINE	2012 ELECTRUMIC SWITCHING EQUIT TECH
IN AIRCRE COM/HAVG/ELEC/WEAP/SYS/IECH-IRNE CHA	
12 AIRCHE COM/NAVG SYS TECH A-4/1A-4/0A-4	
	2831 MICROWAVE EQUIP TECH
10 AIRCRE CUM/NAVG/ELEC/WEAP/SYS/IECH OV-10	2041 GROWN MADIO REPAIRER
14 AINCAT COM/MANU/ELEC STS JECH CH-46	2012 TINS MAINITIMACE ILLY
	2013 FLKS SUFFUNI MAINIENANCE IECH 2061 RADIO IFCHNICIAN
SA AIRCRE ELEC SYS TECH AV-8	
SA ATRICAS ELECTRICAL ROLL CONTROLL ROLL CONTROL CONTR	2861 COMM SECURITY EQUIP TECH
MFAP	2004 GROUND MAUAN METAINEN 2004 ADIIIIRDY RICTIONAID CYCICLE DEDAIDED
WEAP	2887 CONNER MORIAR RADAR REPAIRER
33 AIRCRF RADAR RECOM/CAMPA SYS TECH RF-48	
36 AIRCRF ELEC COUMMASR SYS LECH EA-68	2891 DATA/COM MAINTENANCE CHIEF
31 AVIONICS MAINTENANCE CHIEF	5900 BASIC ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE MARINE
34 ADVC AIRCRI ELECTINSTRIFIGHT CHIRL SYS TECH IMA	
11 AIRCRE COMMINAVG SYS TECH-TRNEE INA	TA TA
A A POCPE MAKES AND THE TANK	
13 AIRCRE NAVIS SYS LECT LIFT/RADAR/TACAN IMA	¥ :
A ALBOR CONTINUED TO THE TWO	
A AINCHE CHIFTIGERAPHIC STS TECH IMA	SECONTAINE CONTINUOUS WAVE MADAN TECHNICIAN
MAINCAL ELEC SYS IFCH-TRNEF	¥ 5
12 AIRCRF ELEC/INSIR/FLT CIRL SYS IFCH FX WAS THA	¥
13 AIRCRF ELEC/INSTR FLF CIRL SYS IECH HELCP/8V 18 IMA	AVIA
34 ADVD AIRCRE ELEC/INSIR/FLI CIRL SYS TECH IMA	AVIATION
SZ AVIONICS TEST SET(ATS) TECH IMA	
SA AIBCRET INCREAS AND SYS IST STA(RSTS) TECH IMA	5942 AVIATION RADAR REPAIRER (AN/1PS-59)
SS HYBRID 1EST SET TECH IMA	
SE AIRCRE FWD LOOKING INFRARED/ELEC-OPTICAL TECH IMA	
37 AFRCRF RADCOM/CAT 1110 TECH IMA	
SO ATHUR ELEC EQUIP IST SET/ABL ELEC TST SET TECH IMA	
24 AIRCRE WEAPONG SYG INCHI AMESTO THA	SOSZ AIM TRAFFIC CONTROL NAVIGATIONAL AIDS IECTRICIAN
75 AIRCRE RADR/IR RECOMMAISSANCE SYS IFCII IMA	A
6 AERIAL CAMERA/ADAS SYS TECH IMA	
18 ADVINC AIRCRET WEAPONS SYS TECH IMA	TACTICAL
12 AIRCRE ELEC CONNIERMENSIRE SYS TECH FIXED WINGS IMA	1ACT ICAL
13 FINCH FIEL CONNIEMERSHE SYS JECH HELICOPIER IMA 14 FINCH FIEL COUNTERMERSHE SYS JECH FR. 144	5974 IACTICAL DATA COMMUNICATIONS CENTRAL REPAIRER 5974 IACTICAL AIR COMMAND CENTRAL IECTRACIAN
15 ADVINCO AIRCRE ELECT COUNTERMEASURE TECH IMA	TACTICAL
PASIS DATA CONTRIBITION & REPAIR TECH	IACIICAL
FOR THE POST OF THE PROPERTY O	5070 TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS CENTRAL TECHNICIAN SYS
3 CABLE SYSTEMS IECH	ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE
IB TELETYPE & TACTICAL OFC MACHINE TECH	5994 TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE CHIEF

OTHAIR (Other Air)

3421 PERSONAL FINANCIAL RECORDS CLERK 3431 IRAVEL CLERK 3432 DISBURSER/DISBURSING CHIEF 3441 NAF ALDIT TECHNICIAN 3451 ACCOUNTING TECH 4460 BASIC LEGAL SERVICES MARINE 4421 LEGAL SERVICES SPECIALISI 4425 LEGAL SERVICES REPORTER(STENDIYPE)	CONTRACT SAME CONTRACT	2500 BASIC OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATOR 2515 FIELD WIREWAN 2514 UNIT LEVEL SWITCHBOARD INSTALL/MAINTAINER 2515 UIS CENTRAL OFC OPERATOR/MAINTAINER			4099 DATA PROCESSING CHIEF
6500 BASIC AVIATION ORDWANCE WARINE 6511 AVIATION ORDWANCE IRAINEE 6521 AVIATION ORDWANCE MANITIONS TECHNICIAN 6531 AIRCRAFT ORDWANCE TCHNICIAN 6531 AIRCRAFT ORDWANCE TCHNICIAN 6541 AVIATION ORDWANCE COULPAKIN REPAIR TECHNICIAN 6551 MARINE WING WEAPONS UNIT SPECIALIST 6500 BASIC WEATHER SERVICE MARINE 6821 WEATHER OBSERVER		HAWK MISSILE AIR COMMAND A TACTICAL AIR AIR SUPPORT O BASIC AIR TRA AIR TRAFFIC C	AIR RADA AIR AIR AIC	ADMIN BED BASIC ADMIN MARINE BIST PERSUANEL CLERK BIST WIT DIARY CLERK BIST ADMIN CLERK BIST ADMIN CLERK BIST ADMIN CLERK BIST SADMIN CHERK BIST SADMIN CHERK BIST SAPPOWER THE OSYS ANALYST BIST SAPPLY ADMIN CHIEF SAB SIPPLY ADMIN & OPER CLERK SAB SAD WARRIOUSE CLERK SAB WARRIOUSE CLERK SAB SACIALIST	SUBSISIENCE AVIATION SU

2629 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 2631 NON-MORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR/ANALYST 2643 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2649 CRYPTANALYST 2651 SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATOR 2659 CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT SPECIALIST 2671 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, PERSTAN/SEMITIC 2673 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, EAST ASIAN 2674 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, SPANISH	2675 CATPOLOGIC LINGUIST. STANDS 2675 CATPOLOGIC LINGUIST. STANDS 2691 SIGNALS INTELLGNCE/ELECTRNC WARFARE CHIEF 3100 BASIC TRAFFIC WANAGEMENT MARINE 3112 TRAFFIC WANAGEMENT SPECIALIST 3100 BASIC FOOD SERVICE WARINE 3372 ENLISTED AID (FOOD) 3381 FOOD SERVICE SPECIALIST 3500 BASIC WOTOR TRANSPORT WARINE 3513 BOOY REPAIR MECHANIC 3522 INTERMEDIATE AUTOMOTIVE MECHANIC 3522 INTERMEDIATE AUTOMOTIVE MECHANIC 3524 FUEL AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS MECHANIC 3525 CRASH/FIRE/RESCUE VHICLE WECHANIC 3529 WOTOR TRANSPORT WAINTENANCE CHIEF 3531 WOTOR YEHICLE OPERATOR 3534 SEMITRAILER REFUELIER OPERATOR 3534 SEMITRAILER REFUELIER OPERATOR 3534 SEMITRAILER REFUELIER OPERATOR 3535 LOGISTICS VEHICLE SYSTEM OPERATOR 3536 LICENSING EXAMINER 4100 BASIC WARINE CORPS EXCHANGE WARINE	CLUB WANK BASIC PUBI BROADCAST PRINT JOUR PHOTOJOURN PHOTOJOURN CRAPHICS STAIN GRAPHICS STAIN GRAPHICS STAIN GOMBAT STI COMBAT PHC COMBAT PHC COMBAT PHC COMBAT PHC TRAINING A BASIC MUSI INSTRUMENT	
ا مغ		1500 BASIC PRINT AND REPRODUCTION MARINE 1521 OFFSET PRESS OPERATOR 1532 PROCESS CAMERA OPERATOR 1541 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1542 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1543 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1543 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1544 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1544 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1545 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1545 REPRODUCTION CHIEF 1544 RASAULT ARMS REPAIR/TECH 1545 COMBAT TANK REPAIR/TECH 1545 COMBAT TANK REPAIR/TECH 1545 COMBAT TANK REPAIR/TECH 1546 MACHINIST 1546 MACHINIST 1547 OPTICAL INSTRUMENT REPAIRER 1548 CROUND ORD WEAPONS CHIEF/SR GRD ORD CHIEF 1558 ORDINANCE ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT CHIEF 1558 ORDINANCE ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT CHIEF	

MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE PLANS/OPERATIONS SPEC SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS(OFFICER: 1B, ENLISTED) PARACHUTIST(OFFICER: 2E/ENLISTED) BASIC MARINE WITH ENLISTMENT GUARANTEE TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS SPEC (OFFICER: 7E/ENLISTED) SMALL COMPUTER SYSTEMS OPERATOR/PROGRAMMER SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE MARINE CORPS SERGEANI MAJOR/FIRST SERGEANT BASIC MARINE GENERAL SERVICE SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT-ENLISTED BILLET DESIGNATOR-ENLISTED COLLEGE DEGREE-ENLISTED 9915 9916 9917 9918 9952 9981 9971 1666 MUSICIAN, CONTRABASS BUGLE
MUSICIAN, PERCUSSION (DRUM AND BUGLE CORPS)
BASIC NICLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL MARINE
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE SPECIALIST
BASIC MILITARY POLICE AND CORRECTIONS MARINE 5563 MASICIAN, PERCUSSION(DRUMS, TIMPANI, AND MALLETS) 5565 MUSICIAN, PIANO OR ACCORDION OR GUITAR 5571 DRUM AND BUGLE CORPS DRUM MAJOR RECONNAISSANCE MAN SCUBA QUALIFIED
RECONNAISSANCE MAN PARACHUTE AND SCUBA QUALIFIED MARINE CORPS SEC FORCE CLOSE QUART BITL TEAM MBR EDUCATION ASSISTANT CRIME PREVENTION PHYSICAL SECURITY SPECIALIST IUBA AND STRING BASS/ELECTRIC BASS RECONNAISSANCE MAN PARACHUTE JUMP QUALIFIED MARINE CORPS SECURITY FORCE (MCSF) GUARD SOPRAND OR MELLOPHONE BUCLE QUALITY ASSURANCE TECH (SUBSISTENCE) SURVEILLANCE SENSOR MAINTENANCE MAN WATER SAFETY/SURVIVAL INSTRUCTOR INTERPRETER (DESIGNATED LANGUAGE) SURVETLLANCE SENSOR OPERATOR INFANIRY OPERATIONS SPECIALIST DRILL INSTRUCTOR
MARKSMANSHIP INSTRUCTOR
SMALL ARMS WEAPONS INSTRUCTOR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE COUNSELOR MUSICIAN, FRENCH HORN BUGLE MUSICIAN, BASS BARITONE BUGLE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS NCO CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO MILITARY POLICE MILITARY POLICE DOG HANDLER ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR CORRECTIONAL SPECIALIST CORRECTIONAL COUNSELOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR POLYGRAPH EXAMINER CAREER RECRUITER CAREER PLANNER CADRE TRAINER SCOUT SNIPER RECRUITER MISICIAN. MUSICIAN GUARD 8152 8153 8154 8532 8538 8541 8541 8563 8611 5576 5579 5888 5811 5812 5813 5814 5821 5821 5831 8652 8653 8654 8654 5577 5593 5700 8633 8231 8411 8412 8431 8441 8511 8631 6151 8421 8531

and the same of th			
THE STATE OF THE		995	CREMIAN
MATINE CLERK 1814 1815		YEAR TIPLE	
INTELLIGENCE PROTALIST INTELLIGENCE WANTEST INTELLIGENCE WANTE	_	2191	
CHECK CHEC		1833	
		2100	
MANINGER SPECIALIST 3 111 11		1112	
PARTONNELL (IDECE PECIALIST 111 IONITION OF PECIALIST 112 IONITION OF PECIALIST			
BASTEL DRIELLIGENCE SPECIALIST 2 2141 SELL -PROPELLIGENCE	_	2131	
INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST 67 2145 GODGELILIO ANTI- INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST 67 2145 GODGELILIO ANTI- INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST 7 2145 GODGELILIO ANTI- INTERPREDATION SPECIALIST 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MANTE HINTERPREDATION SPECIALIST 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MANTE HINTERPREDATION SPECIALIST 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MANTE HINTERPREDATION SPECIALIST 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MATERIAL ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MATERIAL ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MATERIAL ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MATERIAL ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE MATERIAL ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN OF VEHICLE ANTI- INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 7 2145 GODGEN		2141	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
IMPETICITIONE SPECIALIST 7 145 COURT TOWN TREATED 7 145 COURT TO	COUNTERINTELL IGENCE SPECIAL!	1716	71.00
INTELLIGENCE CHIEF 1	INTELL PRINCE SPECIALIST		
MITCH CRACE CHIEF	MAGENT INTERPRETATION SPECI		
MATERIAN			
MARCHANIST MANIET MAN			=
AND PRODUCT			E
ACTOR ACTION ACTOR ACTION ACTON ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTON ACTION ACTION ACTIO		2161	
RECURDANCE S51 2175 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S53 2175 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S53 2175 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S53 2180 GROUND GRD WEAPONS S53 2181 GROUND GRD WEAPONS S53 S53 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S53 S54 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S53 S54 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S54 S54 ELECTOR 1/1 ACREMAN S54 ELECTOR		2171	
ALT OFTENANT STANCE MAN		2124 E18C. OPT / I ACED /CAL	1000
CONTRINGEN CONTRIVEN CONTRIVEN CONTRIVEN CONTRIVEN CONTRIVEN CONTRINGEN CONTRIVEN		2181 CDCIBIO ODD BEADONE	R CARD IECH
Page 1975 Page 1975 Page 2975 Page 2975 Page 1975 Page 2975 Page		2182	
Main		2 198	
187 2356 ERPIGNING 187 2356 ERPIGNING 187 2356 ERPIGNING 187 2358 GROWN MICLER GROWN 197 2358 GROWN 197 2359 GROSS GROWN 197 2351		211	ISP WANTINE
A		3116	
19 250 100		3163	
19 229 5312 1110 110 110 120		2002	
MAINTENERS MATERIAN 22 2513 CONSTRUCTION WIRELANN 22 2513 CONSTRUCTION WIRELANN 22 2513 CONSTRUCTION WIRELANN 23 2514 CHOIST 2515 UNSTRUCTION WIRELANN 2515 UNSTRUCTION WIRELANN 2515 UNSTRUCTION WIRELANN 2515 UNSTRUCTION WIRELAND 2515 UNSTRUCTION WIRELAND 2515 UNSTRUCTION OF EACH 2515 WIRELAND 2515		9967	
1930 CAST 1930 CAST 194 195 CAST 195		2162	
10 2515 ULS CENTRAL 10M SPECIALIST 19 2515 ULS CENTRAL MANAGEMENT ISSUED 19 2515 ULS CENTRAL OF CONTRALONALINIANIER 190 2515 WIRE CHIEF CONTRALONAL CONTRALONAL SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF CONTROLONAL SERVICE STATIONAL CHIEF CONTROLONAL CHIEF CONTROLONAL SERVICE STATIONAL CHIEF CONTROLONAL CHIEF CONTRO	MASIC LONISINGS MANINE	2513	
199 2519 WIRE CHIEF 194 2519 WIRE WARTEN 194	MAINIEMANCE MANAGEMENI	2514	AINTAINFR
AND CLIVERY SECLALIST AND CLIVERY SECLALIST COMEAT SERVICE SUPPORT SECLALIST COMEAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF BOSIC SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF BOSIC SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF COMEAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF BOSIC SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF COMEAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF COMEAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHIEF TIELD ARTHLERY MACHANIA THE ARTHLERY MACHANIA THE ARTHLERY MACHANIA THE ARTHLERY MACHANIA THE ARTHLERY PREATORS MAN THE SUPPORT MAN THE SUPPORT WAN THE SUPPORT SALOW THE SUPPORT SALOW THE SUPPORT WAN THE SUPPORT THE OPERATOR THE SUPPORT WAN THE SUPPOR	(CCISTICS/EMBARKATION SPECI	2515	0.2
COMBATICE SUPPORT SPECIALIST 004 2331 FIELD RADIO OPERATOR 0 2333 MICROWARE EQUIPMENT OFFERATOR 0 2334 MICROWARE EQUIPMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	_	2519	MCM
COMEAL SERVICE SURPORT CHIEF		25.11	•
TIELD ARTILLERY CANNOWERN 5 233 RADIO TELEGRAPH OPERATOR 1			970 ·
FIELD ARTHLERY CANNONCERN 638 7335 FLEET SALIGNATION CERNATION 71510 ARTHLERY RADDA OFFRATOR 725 FLEET SALIGNATION OFFRATO			
THE PROPERTY AND THE PROJECTILEMAN 0 233 FLEET SATCOM TEMBINAL OPERATOR		28.44	
THE D ARTHLERY RADAR OPERATOR		28.36	704
4		9507	ATOR
TIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS WAN 63 2539 CHAIND WORLE FORCES SATICM RADIO CHIEF SUPPORT WAN 63 2549 COMMINICATION CENTER OFFERATOR 2549 COMMINICATION CENTER CHIEF 95 2549 COMMINICATION OFFRATOR		1667	
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	FIELD APPLIERS OFFDATIONS	2538	
The control of the	FIRE CHEDON MAN		o chier
131 131		2542	
ELECTRICATION CHARGE CHA		2549	
TELECTRICAL CONTINUENT REPAIRS SECURIES 250 PERS MASTER STATION OPERATOR	CICCIALINA CONTRACTOR DEPOS	2581	
THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY	CLECIMICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIR	2585	
116 2569 RASIC SIGNAL INTELIGNC/GND ELEC WARFAR INTELIGNC/GND ELEC WARFAR INTELIGNC/GND ELEC WARFAR FABRIC REPAIRED 16 2621 WANNAL WORSE INTERCEPT OFERATOR 18 2631 WANNAL WORSE INTERCEPT OFFRATOR 2531 WANNALWES INTERCEPT OFFRATOR 2531 WON-WORSE INTERCEPT OFFRATOR 2531 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2531 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2531 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2531 SPECIAL INTELLICENCE COMMUNICATOR 2531 SPECIAL INTELLICENCE WARFARE CHI 2531 SPECIAL INTELLIC		2591	
10 2621 WANDAL WORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR 10 2621 WANDAL WORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR 10 2631 WANDAL WORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR 10 2631 WON-WORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR 291 2641 WON-WORSE INTERCEPT OPERATOR 291 2642 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2643 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2643 CRYPTOLOGIC TRANSLATOR 2644 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, FERSTAN/SEMITIC 2644 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, RUSSIAN 2646 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST, RUSS		2686	WARFAR OPFR
TABHIC REVAILS TABHIC REVAILS TABHIC REVAILS TABHIC REVAILS TABHIC RESIDENCE		2621	
INSTITE THE CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIP MARTINE 55 2013 FING COURT OF ERAIOR 291 291 2013 FING COURTRY OPERATOR 291 2013 FING COURTRY OPERATOR 2013 FING COURTRY AND REPRODUCTION MARTINE 1 2019 FROCESS CARREATOR 2013 FROCESS C	PARMIC MEPAIN SPECIALISI	2629	
METAL WORKER METAL WORKER WETTE COURT MECIANIC ENG COURT CHIEF FINE ASSISTANT CAMBAT FUE BULK TUEL SPECIALIST GASIC PRINT AND REPRODUCTION MARINE OF SET PRESS OPERATOR SET PRESS OPERATOR SET PRESS OF CAMERA OF PERATOR SET PRESS OF CAMERA OF PE	HASIC ENG CONSTRUCTION AND	2631	LYST
ENG FOUR MECIANIC 291 2649 ENG FOUR OFFRATOR FINCK COURT CHIEF ENG FOUR CHI		2643	
FING FOURTY OF ERAIDR FING COURTY OF ERAIDR FING COURTY OF ERAIDR FING COMBAT ENG. COMBAT ENG. GARDAL FULL BASIC FRINT AND REPRODUCTION MARINE OF SET PRESS OF ERAIDR SET		2649	
THICK CHARMY OPERATOR CHIC COULP CHIEF ENG ASSISTANT CHARATERO COMBATERO		2651	
COMBAT EME COMBAT		_	
COMBAT ENG. COMBAT ENG. COMBAT ENG. COMBAT ENG. COMBAT ENG. COMBAT CAMERA OF CRAINE COFFEE PRESS OF ERAIOR COFFEE PRESS		CRYPIOLOGIC	2111
BULK FUEL SPECIALIST BUSINE FUEL SPECIALIST BUSINE AND REPRODUCTION MARINE OF SET PRESS OF ERAIOR		2673 CRYP1010G1C	
GASIC PRINT AND REPRODUCTION MARINE 20 2001 OFFSET PRESS OFFRATOR 20 2001 FROCESS CAMERA OFFSATOR 5 2010	CHARACTER CTR	2674 CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST.	
OF SET PRESS OF FRATOR PROCESS CAMERA OF RATION S 2001 S 2001		2675	
FROCESS CAMERA OF RAZION 5 2001		2691	ARE CHIEF
2011		2000	w

Table B-2. (Continued)

2818 TELETYPE & TACTICAL OFC MACHINE TECH	9	4030 DATA CONTROL SPECIALIST
COMPUTER TECHNICIAN	•	4041 TELEPROCESSING SPECIALIST
	6 (
	C (4865 PRIXIRAMARR, ALC
MICHOCOMPUTER REPAIRER		-
	N '	_
	n (
2831 MICHOMANE FULLY 18CM	Ç.	
		_
	9	
2841 GROUND HADIO REFAIRER	: • •	
	• 6	
2043 FLM3 SUPPLINI MAINIEMANCE TECH 2041 DADIO IECIMICIAN	· -	ASSE BASIC FUBLIC ATTAIRS MARINE
	• •	
2007 AN/17C=53 NACIO 11CM	9	A 333 PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY
NETROLOGY TECH	?-	4352 PIOLOGOGARACIO
	. 6	
	₩.	FGAI
	32.	
	•	LEGAL
	e	BASIC
	•	_
2891 DATA/COMM MAINTENANCE CHIEF	•	4621 TRAINING EQUIPMENT AND LIPPARY SPECIALIST
3888 BASIC SUPPLY AIMINISTRATION & OPER WARINE	2)	4641 COMBAT STILL PHOTOGRAPHER
	6.16	COMBAI
3844 FURCHASING AND CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	'n	COMBAI
3051 WAREHOUSE CLERK	679	COMBAT
	42	
	62	_
	396	
3073 AUTOMATED INFO SYS COMPUTER OPERATOR	6-	
SING BASIC TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT MARINE	~	5523 INSTRUMENT REPAIR SPECIALIST
3112 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST	97	5526 MISICIAN, 080E/ENGLISH HORN
	6	
	•	
	9	MUSICIAN.
BASIC AUDITING FINANCE & AC	P (MUSICIAN.
3421 PERSONAL FINANCIAL RECURDS CLERK	D 40	MISICIAN.
	~	S MUSICIAN.
	- 6	Ž
) (A MAISICIAN.
	25	MISTOTAN, TODA AND STRING BASS/ELECTRIC FASS
BOOY REPAIR MECHANIC	•	MUSICIAN
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE	0/ 7	I DRUM AND B
	2.38	MISICIAN.
	- ·	MISICIAN, FRENCH HORN BUGLE
FUEL AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	9	MISICIAN.
	•	MISICIAN.
5529 MUTUR IMANSPORT MAINTENANCE CHIEF	1206	STAM BASICIAN, PERCUSSION (DRUM AND BUCLE CORPS)
	23.2	MAINTEAN DISTORTION AND CHEMICAL MARINE
STALIBALIER REFUELLER OPE		BASIC MILITARY BOLICE AND CORRESSIONS SPECIALIST
		MILITARY POLICE
	•	WILLTARY POLICE INC. HANDLER
	24	5813 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR
	•	5814 CRIME PREVENTION PHYSICAL SECURITY SPECIALISE
4834 COMPUTER OPERATOR	128	5821 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR
		•

THE CONTRICT CONTRICT STATES AND THE CONTRICT OF CONTRICT
MATINE
STECIALIST STE
ALL COUNSELOR INTECTION REPAIRER SALING RECAIRER AND GEOLI REFAIRER SALION COORDINATION CEUTRAL REPAIRER AND GEOLIAN REPAIRER RADAR TECHNICIAN CONTROL TECHNICIAN BE SYSTEM MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN ADIO REPAIRER E TECHNICIAN ADIO REPAIRER E TECHNICIAN ADIO REPAIRER E TORNICOLICAL EQUIPMENT TECHNICIAN COUTROL LECHNICIAN ADIO REPAIRER (ANJ/195-39) RE CONTROL REPAIRER ADIO REPAIRER (ANJ/195-39) RE CONTROL LECHNICIAN ADIO REPAIRER (ANJ/195-39) RE CONTROL LECHNICIAN COUTROL COURTOR CENTRAL RECINICIAN C COUTROL CAMAND CENTRAL RECINICIA ANTA COMAND CENTRAL RECINICIA ANTA COMAND CENTRAL LECINICIAN C COUTROL CA-130 MECINNIC CA-130 MECINNIC CA-130 MECINNIC CA-130 MECINNIC FA-130 MECINNIC
3277° \$ \$ 402° 52° 62° 62° 62° 62° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63° 63

24 24 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	,	~ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ % @
7051 AIRCRAFT FIREFICHTING AND RESCUE SPECIALIST 7208 BASIC AIR CONTRIVENT SUPPORT/ANTIAIR WARFARE MARINE 7212 LOW ALTITUME AIR DEFENSE GURRER 7222 HAWK WISSILE SYSTEM OFERATOR 7234 AIR COMAND AND CONTROL ELECTRONICS OFERATOR 7235 ACTIONAL AIR DEFENSE CONTROLLER 7242 AIR SUFFORT OFERATIONS OFERATOR 7368 BASIC AIR HEAFT CONTROLLER 7311 AIR HRAFT CONTROLLER-IRAINE 7312 AIR HRAFT CONTROLLER-IRAINE		9915 SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT—NITSIED 9916 BILLET DESIGNATOR—ENLISTED 9917 COLLEGE DEGREE—ENLISTED 9919 WARINE AIM GROUND TASK FORCE FLAMS/OFFRATIONS SPEC 9935 SPECIAL TECHNICAL OFFRATIONS(OFFICER: 18.ENLISTED) 9955 PARACHALIST/SCURA MARINE (OFFICE) 9956 GROUND STAFTY SPECIALIST (OFFICER: 2F/ENLISTED) 9957 PARACHALIST/SCURA MARINE (OFFICER: 2F/ENLISTED) 9971 RASIC MARINE WITH ENLISTMENT GUARANTEE 9971 FASIC MARINE WITH ENLISTMENT GUARANTEE
17.7 T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T	571 5 5 7 7 8 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	26 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N COM/N	SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS SYS	

APPENDIX C

HISTORICAL TABLE OF SRB MULTIPLES, BY PMOS

APPENDIX C

HISTORICAL TABLE OF SRB MULTIPLES, BY PMOS

This appendix contains two tables. Table C-1 reports historical SRB multiples for Zone A for each MOS. Time periods are grouped roughly in the table by the fiscal year of the multiple. Notes at the end of the table specify the exact periods. Additionally, the four periods during which the Marine Corps suspended SRBs are noted at the end of the table. These suspension periods are not entered as a set of zero multiples, but are hard-coded into the text of the computer program. I

Table C-2 is a SAS frequency, by decision year, of the length of Zone A reenlistments by the level of the SRB multiple. (Note that FY 1990 is only through June 1990.)

^{1.} See CNA Information Memorandum 127, CNA's Longitudinal ARSTAT Tracking Files for Enlisted Marines, by Greg W. Steadman, forthcoming.

Table C-1. Zone A bonus levels by MOS (see note at end for dates)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
0100	9	9	00	00000	000000	9999	000	99	99	0000000	0000
0121	9	1	11	10000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
0131	0	1	11	10100	000000	0200	011	99	99	000000	9999
0151	9	1	11	00000	000011	0111	222	01	10	000000	9999
0161	Ö	0	99	02000	000000	0001	222	01	10	0000000	2220
0193	Ö	1	11	11000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000	0000
0200	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	600	99	99	0000000	9999
0211	9	3	33	44433	333444	4343	333	24	44	444444	5550
0231	0	3	33	44431	110000	9999	034	34	44	444444	5554
0241	0	3	33	44433	333444	4432	999	99	04	444444	5555
0251	0	3	33	44433	333444	4430	011	10	04	444444	5555
0290	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	9999999	0000
0291	0	3	30	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
0300	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000	0000
0311	0	0	02	10000	000022	0112	223	92	20	0111111	9999
0312	9	0	99	99999	000002	2220	999	99	99	666666	0000
0313	9	0	99	99999	000002	2222	223	24	44	222222	3000
0321	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	3000
0331	0	0	92	10000	000022	0112	223	92	20	0111111	0110
0341	0	0	02	10000	000022	0112	211	92	24	0111111	9999
0351	9	9	02	10010	000022	0112	200	02	20	0111111	9999
0352	0	0	92	13312	223444	4412	203	92	24	0111111	2220
0369	0	0	0 2	32100	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9 999
0400	0	Ð	99	90000	000000	0000	999	99	99	00 00000	0000
0411	2	3	30	02222	222333	1133	333	02	24	0000000	1000
0431	2	0	02	20000	000 001	1120	992	02	24	0000000	0220
9441	2	0	0 1	10000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
9451	2	0	9 3	33322	222333	3333	333	92	22	1111111	2000
0481	2	3	30	00000	999999	0033	333	93	33	1111000	9999
0491	2	3	30	99999	000000	0000	999	99	00	0000000	9999
0800	0	0	99	0090 0	000000	0000	999	99		0000000	9999
0811	0	0	Ø 1	11100	000011	0112	223	12		0000000	9999
0842	-	0	99	00011	113555	5531	100	92		2222000	9999
0844	_	0	9 0	99911	113555	5533	300	91	10	999999	0000
0846	-	Ø	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99		0000000	0000
0847	_	0	01	13311	113555	5531	100	93		0000000	9999
9848	-	0	0 1	10623	333555	5543	333	90		0000000	9999
0849		Ø	00	00000	999999	9999	000	99		000000	0000
0861	-	0	01	10000	003555	5544	422	94	-	3333333	4000
0891	-	9	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99		000000	9999
0894		0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99		000000	0000
1100		0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99		9999999	9999 9 9 99
1121	9	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99		9999999 9999999	9999
1141	0	0	99	00020 00002	000124	4544 4544	333 333	24 24		444444	4455
1142		9	10 00	00023	122334 333334	4422	233			0000000	9999
1101	Ð	v	90	90023	JJJJJ-	7746	233	42	23	000000	2000

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
1169	0	1	10	00000	000000	0020	999	99	00	0000000	0000
1171	0	1	10	00002	023334	4433	342	92	22	222222	9999
1173	0	0	Ø 1	10000	999999	9999	999	99	99	999999	9999
1179	0	0	00	00000	999999	0000	000	00	99	0000000	9999
1181	0	Ø	00	00000	003323	3333	344	03	35	1111000	9999
1182	0	0	00	00000	000012	2331	034	03	30	999999	9999
1183	0	0	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99	99	9999999	9999
1300	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	00	0000000	9999
1316	0	0	00	00001	112333	3433	322	04	43	222222	4444
1341	0	0	01	10000	000011	1220	000	01	11	3333333	3330
1345	0	0	00	99999	000111	1220	002	04	40	000000	9999
1349	0	0	00	01000	000000	0000	000	99	99	000000	0000
1371	0	0	00	99999	000112	0223	333	02	23	1111111	0000
1379	9	0	00	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	000000	9999
1381	0	0	00	00000	999999	9999	999	99	00	9999999	9999
1391	0	0	01	11030	200124	4433	242	04	42	0000000	9999
1400	9	0	00	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
1411	0	2	21	10000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
1421	0	0	00	00000	0 00000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
1422	0	0	00	00000	999999	9999	999	99	00	0000000	9999
1431	0	2	22	20000	999999	0000	999	00	99	0000000	9999
1432	ð	9	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
1441	0	2	22	23000	001100	0000	999	02	20	9999999	.0000
1442	0	2	21	00002	02 0 000	9999	999	92	20	2222444	5555
1453	0	2	20	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
1500	9	0	00	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
1521	2	2	20	00000	00000 0	0000	020	02	20	000000	9999
1522	2	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
1531	2	0	00	00000	999999	0000	000	99	99	0000000	0000
1532	2	9	01	13320	999999	9999	999	0 3	34	000000	1110
1541	2	2	22	20030	300000	9999	000	99	99	999999	0000
1542	2	0	00	00000	000000	0000	00 0	99	99	000000	0000
1800	9	0	00	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	000000	0000
1811	9	1	11	31000	999999	0021	133	10	00	000000	0000
1833	9	1	11	30000	001223	3331	133	02	20	000000	0000
2100	9	0	00	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2111	1	2	21	00001	012322	2322	200	04	40	3333333	1000
2131	1	2	22	23433	333444	4433	200	00	99	0000000	0000
2141	1	2 0	22	22332	222333	3433	342	94	40	1111000	0000
2142	1		00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	41	3333333	3000
2143	Ó	2 0	22	23311	212333	3431	999	04	40	0000000	9999
2144	1	2	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99	35	444444	3000
2145	ť		22	20001	112333	3323	311	0 3	30	9999999	0000
2146	i	2	22	20111	112333	3322	242	94	41	444444	3344
2147	i	9	22 00	23433	333333	3444	445	24	40	0000000	0000
2149	'n	2	20	00000	002222	2333	555	24	40	444444	4440
2161	i		21	00000 16632	000000	0000	999	99	00	9999999	9999
2171	i		21	10032	323333	3322	992	92	24	9999999	4440
2172	İ		-	26654	333334	4555	543	99	43	4444400	3344
2181	i			2003 4 00000	444444	4555	555	24	40	0000000	0000
2191	i	_		00000	000000 000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
2300	ė			00000		0000	000	99	99	0000000	0000
	-	•		-000 0	000000	9999	999	99	99	9999999	0000

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
2311	0	1	10	00000	000000	0233	344	14	40	3333333	9999
2336	0	1	13	34433	333334	4455	555	24	44	444444	5555
2500	0	Ø	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2512	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	. 00	99	0000000	9999
2513	0	2	23	33333	333334	4432	222	94	43	3333333	9999
2519	0	0	99	03333	333333	3330	200	93	34	4444000	5555
2531	0	0	01	99999	999999	0222	999	02	20	0000000	9999
2532	0	2	23	33330	000011	1100	999	93	33	4444000	9999
2534	9	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	9999999	9999
2535	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	05	000000	9999
2536	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	444444	5555
2537	0	0	02	03312	222222	2200	999	99	99	000000	0000
2538	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	999999	9999
2539	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	999999	9999
2542	0	2	21	00000	9999 9 9	0000	011	99	99	000000	9999
2549	0	1	13	33430	301212	2333	322	10	94	4444000	9999
2591	9	0	00	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	000000	0000
2600	Ø	0	00	00000	00 000	0000	000	99	99	000000	0000
2621	2	4	43	32333	335555	5533	302	94	44	4444222	2000
2622	2	4	46	63333	330000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
2629	2	4	46	66655	555555	5555.	554	94	44	4444000	2055
2631	2	4	46	66640	100000	0000	999	94	43	4444333	4444
2632	2	4	45	46655	555555	5555	555	04	40	999999	9999
2639	2	0	9 6	60000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
2641	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
2642	9	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	999 9
2549	2	0	0 6	60000	999999	0000	999	99	99	00000 0	9999
2651	2	4	43	33320	000222	2223	442	92	20	0000000	4444
2659	2	0	96	60000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	99 99
2670	2	0	06	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2671	2	4	40	66655	555555	5553	300	99	95	555555	5000
2672	2	4	46	66655	253333	3330	999	94	40	0000000	9999
2673	2	4	46	66655	553333	3333	311	94	45	555555	5550
2674	2	4	46	66655	553333	3333	322	94	45	555555	5000
2675	2	4	46	66655	555555	5555	522	14	45	555555	0000
2691	2	4	40	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2800	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
2811	3	5	56	66655	555555	5533	333	94	40	1111000	0000
2813	3	5	56	63350	200002	2222	224	10	99	1111000	0244
2814	3	5	56	66650	300000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2818	3	5	56	66655	555555	5530	999	92	20	999999	0355
2819	3	5	56	63355	555555	5555	555	24	44	222222	9999
2822	3	5	56	63005	555555	5555	555	00	05	2222000	9999
2823	3	5	56	64455	555555	5555	555	24	44	444444	9999
2825	3	5	55	43310	000000	9999	999	99	99	2222000	0000
2826	3	5	55	55055	555500	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
2827	· 3	5	56 56	66655	555555	5533	322	14	44	444444	4444
2828	3 3	5	56	65650	300000	0530	003	14	40	1111000	9999
2829 2831	3 3	5 5	56 56	66655	555555	5555	555	24	43	444444	5555
2833	3 3	5 5	56	66630	200000	0000	955 500	24	44	4444333	4000
2834	9	9	90 90	66655 00000	555555	5555	500	04	44	0000000	5555
2841	3	5	56	66435	000000 155544	0000 4433	999	99 94	95 44	444444	5555
4071	J	3	50	00+33	100044	7433	322	₩.	••	4444000	0000

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY9 0
2845	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	00	99	0000000	0000
2861	3	5	56	66605	555555	5555	555	24	44	0000000	5000
2864	3	5	50	06005	550005	5555	500	99	99	0000000	0000
2871	3	5	55	53650	999999	0534	455	94	42	4444000	0000
2874	3	5	56	66605	555555	5554	444	14	44	4444000	4444
2875	3	5	56	66655	555555	5555	533	94	40	0000000	0000
2881	3	5	55	40000	200000	0500	999	99	04	444444	0550
2882	3	5	56	62005	555533	1000	000	04	44	444444	9999
2884	3	5	56	63350	300000	9999	003	99	04	444444	0000
2885	3	5	56	66655	555555	5555	555	24	43	444444	4000
2886	3	5	56	66640	300000	0000	999	94	40	0000000	0000
2887	3	5	56	66630	003311	0110	055	24	43	444444	4442
2888	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
2889	3	5	56	66605	555555	5555	533	14	40	0000000	0000
2891	3	5	50	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
3000	0	9	99	00000	000000	9999	909	99	00	0000000	0000
3043	0	1	12	12112	122333	3330	000	92	24	222222	1110
3044	0	1	11	32333	133333	3333	333	14	44	222222	5555
3051	0	9	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	94	0000000	9999
3052	0	1	10	02000	000002	2222	200	99	03	0000000	0000
3061	0	1	12	23130	100100	0000	999	04	40	1111111	2244
3072	0	1	10	00000	000111	0222	232	99	99	0000000	9999
3073	0	3	30	00000	000000	0000	020	99	01	0000000	0333
3081	0	0	00	00000	000100	0000	999	99	99	000000	9999
3100	0	Ø	00	00000	999999	0000	000	99	99	9999999	9999
3111	0	2	20	00000	000000	0200	000	99	99	9999999	0000
3112	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	000	00	99	0000000	9999
3121	0	2	20	00000	000000	0000	000	00	99	0000000	9999
3141	0	2	20	01000	000000	9999	000	99	99	000000	9999
3191	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
3300	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
3311	0	1	10	00020	100002	2222	223	12	23	999999	9999
3371	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	00	99	0000000	9999
3372	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	00	99	0000000	9999
3381	0	1	10	00000	000012	2222	222	99	92	0000000	9999
3400	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
3421	0	0	01	00000	000000	0012	220	92	20	999999	9999
3431	0	9	01	00000	000000	0012	222	92	24	0000000	0000
3432	0	2	21	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	999999	9999
3441	0	2	23	33332	321222	2222	334	14	44	9999999	4000
3451	9	2	22	12101	211111	0200	999	99	04	222222	4455
3500	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	0000
3513	•	9	99	20001	113333	3332	233	99	94	3333333	9999
3521	0	0	00	00003	133333	3444	442	92	20	999999	9999
3522	0	0	01	01003	133333	3444	442	02	22	444444	3344
3523	0	2	23	31003	133333	3444	442	12	22	444444	3331
3524	0	0	00	01103	133333	3444	442	92	22	444444	3332
3529	0	0	03	10000	000000	0004	400	99	99	0000000	9999
3531	0	0	00	00000	000000	0222	222	92	22	0000000	9999
3533	9	0	0 2	31000	000000	0222	222	12	23	444444	4440
3534	9	0	02	33200	000000	0222	222	12	23	0000000	0000
3535	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	0000
3537	0	0	03	10000	999999	0000	999	99	03	0000000	9999
									-		

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
4000	9	0	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
4016	Ö	à	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
4034	ž	5	54	42000	000000	0022	233	14	42	000000 0	0244
4038	3	5	56	63202	021111	1333	333	10	99	000000 0	0 000
4041	ø	ø	99	00000	000000	0000	003	10	03	2222000	9999
4063	3	5	56	62002	020000	0000	999	92	25	2222000	9999
4065	3	5	56	64100	000000	0000	024	10	99	0 000000	9999
4069	3	5	56	66442	223333	3333	333	14	42	4444000	0000
4071	ĕ	Ö	99	99999	999999	0000	999	99	04	222200 0	0000
4100	ě	Ö	99	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	000 0
4111	ě	ě	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000	9999
4131	ě	ø	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	00000 0	00 00
4132	_	ě	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
4300	ĕ	ŏ	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	96	000 0000	0000
4312	_	ø	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000 0	0000
4313	_	1	13	33333	333333	3333	334	13	34	444444	3330
4321	ĕ	i	13	33333	333333	3333	334		34	444444	4444
4322	-	ė	99	00000	999999	0000	999		99	0000000	0000
4391	ĕ	1	10	00000	999999	9999	000		99	0000000	9999
4400	-	ė	99	00000	000000	0000	999		99	0000000	0000
4421	_	2	20	00221	110000	0000	000			0000000	0000
4422		ð	99	00000	000000	9999	999		00	000000	0000
4423		ő	99	99999	000000	9999	999		99	9999999	9999
4425		ø	99	00000	000000	0020	332			000000	9999
4429		2	26	66655	555555	5555	555		_	000000	0000
4449		õ	99	99999	000000	0000	999			000000	0000
4600		ø	99	99999	000000	9999	000	00	99	000000	0000
4611		1	10	01132	220000	9999	999		40	00 00000	0000
4621		ż	20	00000	000000	0000	000	_		000000	0000
4631		õ	90	99999	000000	9999	996			0000000	0000
4641	-	ø	99	99999	999999	9999	999		-	0000000	9999
4642		1	10	03333	333333	3322	222			222222	0355
4651		ė	99	00000	999999	9999	999			0000000	9999
	_	Ö	99	99999	999999	0000	999		-	0000000	9999
4652 4653		1	11	13333	332222	2222	226			444444	3330
		1	10	01323	332222	2322	222			111111	1110
4671		2	23	36653	333333	3333	323	_		000000	0000
4672	-	1	10	92993	332333	3333	300			000000	9999
4673		ø	99	999 99	000000	9999	996	-		999999	0000
4675	-	1	10	99999	000000	9999	996			0000000	0000
469	•	ė	99	60000	888888	9999	996		-	0000000	9999
5500		9	99	99999	000000	9999	996	_		0000000	9999
5519		Ö	99	99999	999999	9999	996	-	-	0000000	0000
552		ø	99	99999	999999	9999	990	-		0000000	9999
552		9	99	99999	999999	9999	996		•	0000000	0000
552		9	9 0	99999	000000	9999	90			0000000	9999
552	-	9	99	99999	999999	9999	90	_		0000000	9999
553		9	99	00000	999999	9999	99	-		0000000	0000
553 553	-	9	99	99999	999999	9999	99	_	-	0000000	9999
554		9	99	00000	999999	9999	99	-		0000000	9999
		0	99	00000	999999	9999	99		-	0000000	9999
554 554	-	9	99	99999	999999	9999	99	-	-	0000000	0000
		0.	99	99999	999999	9999				0000000	0000
554	. .	.	20	22220	22000 0	2000	- 0	_ 0			

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
5547	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5563	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5565	0	0	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5571	0	0	99	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	000000	9999
5574	0	0	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	999999	0000
5576	9	0	00	00000	0000 00	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5577	0	0	00	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5579	0	0	00	00000	0000 0 0	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5592	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	9999
5593	0	0	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5700	0	0	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5711	0	2	24	44333	333333	2222	022	11	13	444444	5555
5800	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	00000 00	0000
5811	2	3	31	99999	000000	0221	022	0 2	20	0000000	0000
5812	2	0	0 3	30000	002222	2221	022	0 3	30	000000 0	3330
5813	2	3	32	20000	000011	1221	999	93	34	2222222	0330
5821	2	3	33	30000	003333	0222	222	12	24	444444	4444
5822	2	3	30	96999	000000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	0000
5831	2	9	99	00000	100001	1222	222	11	12	- 0000000	0000
5832 5900	9	3	31	10000	100000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5921	4	0 6	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5922	4	6	66 66	65655	555555	5535	500	99	04	3333000	9999
5923	4	6	66	55655	555555	5535	500	99	94	2333000	0000
5924	4	6	66	65655 66655	555555	5535	500	99	04	0000000	0000
5925	4	6	66	66655	555555 555555	5535	533	04	44	2222000	5000
5926	4	6	66	66655	555555 555555	5555 5555	555	24	44	4444000	4000
5927	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555 555	24	40	0000000	0000
5928	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555 5555	555	24	44	4444000	0000
5929	4	6	66	50655	455555	5533	333	20 00	94 94	0000000	0000
5936	ė	ě	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5937	4	6	66	65555	555555	5555	555	04	44	0000000 0000000	9999
5938	4	6	66	64000	000000	9999	999	04	44	2222222	0000
5939	4	6	66	66655	555555	5553	532	99	94	444444	5555 0000
5942	4	6	66	66655	555555	5550	035	04	44	2222000	9999
5943	4	6	66	64600	000005	5530	993	14	44	444444	9999
5944	4	6	66	44655	155555	5554	430	04	44	444444	5555
5945	4	6	66	66645	455555	5534	533	04	44	444444	9229
5947	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	500	04	44	4444000	0000
5948	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555	24	44	4444000	5000
5952	4	6	66	42050	999999	0000	999	04	44	0000000	9999
5953	4	6	66	66655	055555	5555	555	24	44	444444	9999
5954	4	6	66	62250	999999	0000	999	04	44	3333000	9999
5955	4	6	64	30050	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
5956	4	6	66	50050	999999	0000	000	99	99	000000	9999
5957	4	6	66	65250	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5958	4	6	66	60050	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000	0000
5959	4	6	60	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5962 5963	4	6	66	60005	055555	3335	553	14	44	0000000	0000
7207	•	6	66	40005	055555	3325	553	94	44	444444	0000

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
5964	4	6	66	60025	455555	5555	555	24	44	4444000	9999
5974	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555	04	44	0000000	0000
5977	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555	24	44	444444	0000
5978	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555	24	44	4444000	0000
5979	4	6	66	66655	555555	5555	555	24	44	4444000	5000
5982	4	6	66	66635	555500	0530	003	04	44	444444	5554
5993	4	0	99	00000	999 999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
5994	4	0	90	00000	000000	0000	999	99	0 0	0000000	0000
6000	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	. 000	99	99	0000000	0000
6011	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6012	0	1	10	01002	024444	4420	999	92	20	0000000	4000
6013	0	1	10	01002	024444	4442	220	92	22	0000000	0000
6014	0	1	13	31002	024444	4420	030	92	20	0000000	9999
6015	0	1	10	01002	024444	4422	221	93	33	3333333	0000
6016	0	0	99	01002	024444	4420	003	12	24	444444	4422
6017	0	1	13	31002	024444	4442	231	94	40	1111000	9999
6018	0	0	93	31002	02 000 0	000 0	992	04	44	4444333	4455
6019	0	Ø	00	00000	00000 0	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6022	0	1	10	01000	00000 4	4430	022	03	33	0000000	0000
6023	0	0	0 3	31003	034444	4432	222	92	22	3333000	0355
6024	9	1	13	31000	003344	4430	022	94	44	0000000	9999
6025	0	0	92	21003	033334	4432	200	92	24	444444	5442
6026	0	1	13	31000	999999	0032	223	93	34	9999999	0055
6027	0	1	13	31003	034444	4432	233	04	44	444444	5555
6028	0	0	99	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6031	0	9	00	00000	000000	9999	000	99	99	000000	9999
6032	0	1	13	33335	555555	5555	555	24	44	3333600	9999
6035	0	1	10	36655	553311	0111	00 3	94	44	444444	5555
6036	0	0	00	00000	000000	9999	000	99	99	<i>0</i> 000000	0000
6038	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	<i>0</i> 000000	9999
6041	0	0	99	00000	99 999	0000	000	99	99	000 000 0	0000
6042	0	0	00	00000	00 0000	0000	999	99	99	000000	0000
6044	0	1	11	14655	555555	5555	444	14	44	4444000	0355
6046	0	1	12	22232	224444	4433	344	10	05	4444222	4220
6047	0	1	13	33454	544444	4443	334	13	35	444444	5555
6051	0	0	00	00000	9999 99	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6052	0	1	10	01000	002234	4420	9 99	94	40	0000000	9999
6053	9	1	10	01000	002334	4420	999	93		1111111	0000
6054	0	0	0 3	30000	002255	4420	999	04	43	0000000	0000
6055	0	1	10	01001	010234	4430	9 99	94		444444	5550
6056	0	0	0 2	00000	000000	0000	0 55	_	_	444444	5000
6057	0	1	10	01003	035555	4440	999	94		444444	0440
6058	0	1	11	11000	00 0000	9999	993	94		4444222	0000
6059	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	0 00	99		<i>0000000</i>	9999
6060	0	1	11	12101	014444	4543	344	94		444444	4444
6061	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6062	0	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6064	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99		0000000	9999
6067	9	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99		0000000	9999
6071	0	0	99	99999	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6072	9	1	13	32222	323333	3443	332			2222000	9999
6073		0	99	00000	000000	0000	999			2222000	9999
6075	9	1	13	30100	002233	3443	332	04	42	2222222	9229

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY96
5076	0	1	13	30213	334444	4420	033	93	33	0000000	9999
5077	0	1	13	32220	000222	2420	933	94	42	0000000	9999
678	0	1	13	33300	000012	2423	333	94	44	00 000 00	9999
679	0	0	00	00000	00000 0	9999	999	99	99	9999999	9999
681	0	.0	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	9000
982	0	0	0 3	30000	000000	9992	212	14	40	0000000	5000
5083	9	1	13	30003	032335	5420	999	04	43	1111000	9999
084	0	1	13	30000	000055	5420	000	04	43	0000000	9000
985	0	1	13	30000	000005	5420	. 000	92	24	3333000	000
986	0	0	00	00000	003335	5420	992	99	99	222222	999
087	0	1	10	00003	033355	5440	02 1	94	43	22220 00	999
880	0	1	11	10000	003315	5420	999	99	0 5	2222000	0220
089	0	0	99	00000	00000 0	9999	999	99	99	0000000	999
090	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	999
09 1	0	0	00	00000	<i>0</i> 00000	0000	000	99	99	0000000	999
092	0	1	10	00000	003334	4530	999	0 3	30	222222	400
093	0	1	11	10000	003344	4530	999	94	44	444444	555
094	0	1	10	00000	003344	4530	999	01	13	0000000	999
095	0	1	10	00000	000014	4530	999	99	0 5	444444	444
096	0	1	11	00000	000114	4530	003	14	44	444444	500
097	0	1	13	30003	033444	4540	004	13	33	4444333	044
1098	0	1	11	00000	003324	4542	200	04	45	444444	555
100	0	0	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	999
111	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000000	999
1112	2	0	99	00122	120000	0000	000	04	40	1111000	400
3113	2	0	99	00122	120211	153 0	999	04	40	1111111	400
3114	2	0	99	01322	123333	3533	320	02	21	444444	400
3115	2	3	30	01132	125555	5544	400	99	0 2	<i>0000000</i>	400
5119	2	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	999
122	2	3	3 3	31104	444444	4444	400	02	23	0000000	400
123	2	3	33	31104	444444	4444	400	01	12	000000	999
124	2	0	00	01104	44444	4444	400	99	99	000 000	999
125	2	3	33	31104	440000	0000	999	99	0 3	3333333	444
3132	2	Ø	00	00113	431222	2210	999	92	20	0000000	999
3135	. 2	3	30	34445	555555	5544	444	14	45	0000000	999
3142	2	3	31	00000	000000	0220	999	94	43	3333333	400
3143	2	3	33	30000	000 222	2220	022	92	23	3333333	445
3144	2	3	30	00000	000222	2220	999	04	43	444444	445
152	2	3	30	01103	330000	0430	999	94	44	3333333	444
153	2	0	9 1	10003	335555	5430	023	94	40	00000 0 0	999
154	2	0	00	01103	331222	2420	003	14	44	444444	445
155	2	3	30	01103	335555	5423	300	99	99	0000000	999
159	0	0	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99	99	0000000	999
172	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	00	00020 00	444
173	0	0	99	99999	999999	0000	999	99	99	0002000	444
174	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0002044	444
3175	0	0	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	9992999	444
300	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	000	99		0000000	999
5311	0	0	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	999
5312	2	2	23	34334	442344	2244	999	04	40	0000000	999
5313	2	2	23	14334	442222	1530	999	01	10	0000000	000
6314 6315	2	2 2	26 20	64334 04334	442255 442222	5530 2530	999 999	94 99	44 99	0000000 2222220	500 000

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
6316	2	2	20	04334	445555	5530	999	02	24	444444	5000
6317	2	2	26	64334	445555	5542	200	99	99	444444	9999
6318	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	000 000 2	3000
6322	2	2	23	35655	552222	2530	023	14	44	000000	0000
6323	2	2	23	35655	554444	3530	999	04	44	222222	9999
6324	2	2	23	35655	554444	3530	999	99	04	4444443	5555
6331	9	9	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6332		2 2	20	02204	243355	5554	999	92	20	0000000	0000
6333 6334	2	2	23 26	32204 62204	243335 243355	5530 5554	000	02	24	3333333	9999
6335	2	2	20	02204	243355	5544	254 9 0 9	92 91	20 14	000000 0 2222222	9999
6336	2	ő	20 01	10004	243335	5530	999	99	04	444444	0000 0110
6337	2	2	26	62204	244555	5554	400	99	99	0000000	9999
6342		2	21	13454	545555	5540	929	92	23	0000000	9999
6343		2	21	13454	545555	5540	992	93	33	0000000	9999
6344		2	23	33454	542222	2530	999	94	44	444444	9999
6345	2	0	99	03454	542222	2555	533	99	99	9099999	9999
6351	9	0	99	00000	000000	0000	699	99	99	0000000	9999
6352	2	2	23	35655	553333	3333	335	20	99	444444	5000
6353	2	2	23	35655	555555	5554	302	92	24	0000000	9999
6354	2	2	23	35655	553355	5530	999	92	24	0000000	0000
6355	2	2	20	05655	555555	5533	302	01	14	<i>0000000</i>	0000
6357	2	2	23	35655	555555	5543	300	99	99	<i>0000000</i>	0000
6359	2	2	23	35655	555555	5555	500	99	99	0000000	9999
6362	2	2	20	02055	555555	5530	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6363	2	2	23	33355	555555	5530	999	92	20	0000000	9999
6364	2	2	22	20005	255555	5555	531	01	14	444444	9999
6365 6367	2	2	23 23	20003 36655	033333 553555	3530	999	91	10	444444	0000
6371	9	9	23 00	90000	999999	5555 0000	555 909	99 99	91 99	0000000 0000000	9999 9999
6372	2	2	23	33335	554444	4420	999	99	91	444444	9999
6374		2	23	33335	253311	1000	933	94	44	444444	5000
6386	2	2	23	30000	100000	9999	999	01	10	9999999	9999
6391	- 2	9	99	00000	999999	9999	999	99	99	9999999	9999
6400	_	Ö	99	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6412		2	23	34654	543311	9999	999	99	20	0000000	0330
6413		2	23	34654	544444	4433	333	92	20	0000000	0000
6414	2	2	23	33324	544444	4430	999	99	40	000000	0000
6415		2	23	36654	543333	2000	992	99	99	0000000	0000
6416		2	23	35554	545555	5540	999	99	99	00 000 00	0000
6422		0	99	99999	000000	9999	999	99	99	0000000	0000
6423		0	99	00000	000000	9000	999	99	94	444444	5555
6432		2	22	26655	555555	5554	231	02	40	0000000	0000
6433		2	23	35655	555555	5554	330	93	30	0000000	9999
6434 6435		2	23 23	34232 34335	224444	4040	999	04	40	0000000	0000
6442		2	23	30000	555555 000 00	5542	200	92	20	0000000	9999
6443		2	23	33100	003311	0000 1021	993 199	92 99	2 0 00	0000000 0000000	99 99 9999
6444		9	93	30020	003333	3120	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6445	2	2	23	34300	003333	2220	999	03	30	0000000	9999
6446		ē	0 3	30002	223333	2232	999	99	99	0000000	9999
6452		2	21	00025	555544	4443	200	94	40	0000000	9999
6453		2	21	10035	555544	4430	999	93	30	0000000	9999
					-						

Table C-1. (Continued)

MOS	FY80	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	FY89	FY90
6454	2	2	21	13005	555544	3310	999	99	99	0000000	0000
6455	2	ē	02	10000	003333	2000	999	04	40	000000	0000
6462	2	2	20	06605	955555	5555	555	24	44	444444	5000
6463	2	ē	00	00005	555555	5555	555	24	44	444444	5553
6464	2	Ö	00	00000	995555	5555	555	24	42	444444	5550
6465	2	2	22	26635	555555	5555	555	24	44	444444	5555
6466	ē	õ	00	00000	000000	9999	000	00	34	22220 00	0000
6467	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	30	0000000	0000
6468	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	000	99	95	444444	3330
6469	. 0	0	99	00000	999999	0000	999	99	40	000000	9999
6472	2	0	00	00135	455555	5552	000	99	00	00000 0	9999
6473	2	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0 000000	9999
6474	2	0	0 3	30123	134422	2000	939	04	40	0000000	9999
6475	2	2	21	11105	555533	2000	999	02	20	444444	0000
6476	2	0	99	00015	555555	5555	555	22	20	444444	0 000
6477	2	2	22	16655	555555	5555	512	03	30	9999999	0000
6478	0	0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	40	9999999	9999
6482	2	2	23	36205	555555	5555	522	94	40	2222000	0000
6483	0	0	00	00000	99999 9	000 0	999	99	45	444444	5555
6484	9	0	00	00000	000000	0000	999	99	40	999999	9999
6485	0	0	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	40	9999999	9999
6492	2	2	23	35524	545544	3441	122	99	99	444444	5555
6493	2	2	23	36655	555555	5444	420	00	99	9999999	9999
6500		0	99	00000	000000	0000	999	99	99	0000000	0000
6511	3	0	99	99999	000000	9999	999	99	99	9999999	0000
6521	3	3	33	30000	004444	4444	444	14	_	3333333	4000
6531	3	3	30	00054	544444	4440	999	04	-	3333333	4440
6532		0	93	36654	542224	4420	999	02		9999999	9999
6533		0	00	00000	999999	0000	999	99		9999999	9999
6534	3	0	01	16554	544444	4420	999	94		0000000	0000
6535		0	92	23654	542455	5533	300	99		9999999	999 9
6536		0	0 3	36654	545555	5532	200	03		0000000	0000
6537		9	03	36554	545555	5543	333			9999999	0000
6538		0	03	32400	999999	9999	999			0000000	9999
6541	3	0	93	33653	535555	5442	233		_	0000000	0000
6542		0	03	34653	535555	5430	995		-	0000000	9999 99 99
6591		0	99	00000	999999	0000	999			9999999 9999999	9999
6800		0	00 03	00000	000000	9999 9999	999 9 9 9			3333333	9999
6821 6822		0 0	03	33323 33103	431100 430000	9999	999			999999	9999
6831		0	99	99999	999999	9999	999	-		0000000	9999
6842		9	99	00033	530000	9999	999	-		9999999	9999
7000		ø	99	00000	000000	9999	999			9999999	9999
7011		ø	99	99999	001111	1100	999			2222000	4000
7041	_	Ö	99	00112	224444	4444	444			9999999	4440
7051	-	ø	0 1	10001	012222	2333	344			0000000	9999
7200		ĕ	99	00000	000000	9999	999			9999999	9999
7212		4	45	53654	544444	4420	992			444444	9999
7221		ø	99	00000	000000	0000	999	-	_		0000
7222		4	45	56655	555555	5500	999		•	4444222	0000
7231	_	0	00	00000	000000	9999	000			000000	0000
7234	_	4	41	14450	300000	0002	200			000000	0000
7236	3	4	45	54455	354444	4544	444	14	43	444444	5550

Table C-1. (Continued)

MCS	FYSØ	F181	FY82	FY83	FYE4	FY85	FY86	F~87	F~88	FYE9	FY90
7239	ø	Э	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99	99	999999	0000
7241	ā	à	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99	99	999999 9	9999
7242	3	Ä	41	13455	553333	3100	992	24	44	999999	9999
7300	ě	3	00	00000	000000	9999	999	99	99	999999	9999
7311	ø	ě	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
	4	6	56	66655	55555	5544	444	14	44	444444	5555
7312		6	66	66655	55555	4530	. 999	94	43	444444	5555
7322		9	96	60000	99999	9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
7324	4	4	46	60000	000000	9999	999	99	99	9999999	9999
7371	*	÷	65	66555	35555	4322	200	99	e 5	444444	5555
7372	4	6				9999	999	99	99	0000000	9999
7381	9	9	00	00000	999999			99	94	444444	5555
7382	4	8	63	02115	55555	5533	222		99	900000	9999
9811	ð	0	99	99999	999999	9999	999	99			
9900	9	0	98	00000	99999	0000	999	99	99	9999999	9999
9971	0	0	99	99999	999999	9999	999	88	.00	0000000	0000
9991	9	9	99	99999	999999	999 9	999	99	88	9999999	6666
9999	0	9	. 66	9999 9	999999	9999	999	99	99	66666 6	9999

NOTE: Time periods for SRB levels (divided as above roughly within the fiscal years) are as follows:

FY	1980	791001	t o	800530	FY	1989	881121	to	890209
			_				890210	10	090312
FY	1981	800531	to	810214			890313	to	890531
							890601	to	890630
FY	1982	810215	to	811991			890701	to	890785
• •		811002	to	820214			896767	to	890814
							899815	to	890930
~	1983	828215	to	821101					
r i	1362	821102	to	821215	EY	1990	898931	to	900207
		821216	10	838228	• • •	.330			900503
		830301		830430			000504	10	900603
		830501	10	636436 636614			200504		900930
		828281	10	536314			90000	10	300330
~	1984	830915	to	831130					
,	1304	831201	to	840131					
		840201							
				840630					
				840731					
		040701	10	840914					
		046061	10	040314					
EV	1985	840915	to	841031					
٠.	. 3 30			850131					
				850414		The S	RB progr	. Out	was suspended, because
				850716		the M	arine Co	701	ran out of tunes.
		0004.0	•••			betwe	en the f	oli	lowing dates:
-		954717		851216					
FY	1986			860430					829792 to 829919
						*			830601 to 830811
		556361	10	860831					841881 to 841819
				Da. 003					851001 to 851114
FY	1987			861207					870615 to 870930
		861208	t o	870514					889715 to 880930
		270515	٠.	880131					
FY	1988								
		550201	10	881129					

Table C-2. SAS listing of reenlistment length, by SRB level

n	EC	E	/=80

REEN LENGTH SRB LEVEL FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT |2 13 14 15 16 TOTAL 74 4299 82 1797 2037 309 32.58 36.93 77.94 1.49 1.34 5.60 41.80 47.38 1.72 7.19 1.91 86.85 89.13 79.76 44.58 48.66 1 189 198 10 45 451 9 3.43 3.59 9.18 0.82 8.18 0.16 43.90 7.75 2.00 41.91 2.22 9.98 7.09 9.78 9.13 6.02 2 0 61 168 23 96 354 3.05 0.53 1.74 6.42 0.00 1.11 17.23 47.46 8.19 27.12 0.00 17.47 6.58 15.12 0.00 2.95 3 14 94 22 121 252 1 2.19 0.02 0.25 1.70 0.40 4.57 0.40 8.73 37.30 5.56 48.02 1.09 0.58 3.68 13.25 19.06 4 28 21 29 0 5 84 0.11 7.14 0.51 33.33 0.00 0.38 0.53 1.52 25.00 34.52 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.10 12.65 4.57 5 0 1 14 3 21 39 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.05 0.71 53.85 0.00 2.56 35.90 7.69 0.55 1.81 3.31 0.00 0.05 6 15 7 14 0 1 37 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.13 0.67 0.00 2.70 40.54 18.92 37.84 4.22 2.20 0.00 0.05 0.59 TOTAL 2069 2554 166 635 5516 92 37.51 1.67 46.30 3.01 11.51 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL

REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT		3	ļ 4	ļ 5	16	TOTAL
0	57 0.76 1.51 79.17	1571 20.83 41.63 67.51	1468 19.46 38.90 46.56	120 1.59 3.18 24.90	558 7.40 14.79 36.98	3774 50.03
1	9 0.12 0.51 12.50	495 6.56 28.13 21.27	839 11.12 47.67 25.61	75 0.99 4.26 15.56	342 4.53 19.43 22.66	1760 23.33
2	5 0.07 0.59 6.94	138 1.83 16.41 5.93	376 4.98 44.71 11.93	59 0.78 7.02 12.24	263 3.49 31.27 17.43	841 11.15
3	0.01 0.21 1.39	54 0.72 11.13 2.32	144 1.91 29.69 4.57	33 0.44 6.80 6.85	253 3.35 52.16 16.77	485 6.43
4	0.00 0.00 0.00	9 0.12 7.09 0.39	58 0.77 45.67 1.84	20 0.27 15.75 4.15	40 0.53 31.50 2.65	127 1.68
5	9.99 9.99 9.99	32 0.42 8.96 1.38	161 2.13 45.10 5.11	117 1.55 32.77 24.27	47 0.62 13.17 3.11	357 4.73
6	9 9.00 9.00 9.00	28 9.37 14.07 1.20	107 1.42 53.77 3.39	58 0.77 29.15 12.03	6 0.08 3.02 0.40	199 2.64
TOTAL	72 0.95	2327 30.85	3153 41.80	482 6.39	1509 20.01	7543 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY

PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT		3	4	15	[6	TOTAL
⊘	48 0.68 1.93 63.16	1166 16.41 46.86 52.15	943 13.27 37.90 30.16	65 0.91 2.61 17.02	266 3.74 10.69 20.70	2488 35.01
1	12 0.17 0.59 15.79	663 9.33 32.72 29.65	1021 14.37 50.39 32.65	75 1.06 3.70 19.63	255 3.59 12.59 19.84	2026 28.51
2	9 0.13 0.94 11.84	251 3.53 26.26 11.23	412 5.80 43.10 13.18	40 0.56 4.18 10.47	244 3.43 25.52 18.99	956 13.45
3	7 0.10 0.70 9.21	94 1.32 9.45 4.20	348 4.90 35.01 11.13	76 1.07 7.65 19.90	469 6.60 47.18 36.50	994 13.99
4	9 9.09 9.00 9.00	8 9.11 6.49 9.36	49 0.69 39.20 1.57	31 0.44 24.80 8.12	37 0.52 29.60 2.88	125 1.76
5	9 9.09 9.09 9.09	5 0.07 8.06 0.22	30 0.42 48.39 0.96	22 0.31 35.48 5.76	5 0.07 8.06 0.39	62 0.87
6	0.00 0.00 0.00	49 0.69 10.77 2.19	324 4.56 71.21 10.36	73 1.03 16.04 19.11	9 0.13 1.98 0.70	455 6.40
TOTAL	75 1.07	2236 31.47	3127 44.01	382 5.38	1285 18.08	7106 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB REEN LENGTH LEVEL

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT	j 	13	14	15	l e	i 70741
	·	-		+	6	TOTAL
9	200 2.66 5.11 87.72	1530 20.33 39.10 75.18	1825 24.26 46.64 47.91	79 1.05 2.02 16.95	279 3.71 7.13 28.30	3913 52.01
1	11 9.15 1.29 4.82	201 2.67 21.85 9.88	521 6.92 56.63 13.68	42 0.56 4.57 9.01	145 1.93 15.76 14.71	920
2	9 0.12 1.28 3.95	94 1.25 13.33 4.62	383 5.09 54.33 10.06	54 0.72 7.66 11.59	165 2.19 23.40 16.73	7 05 9.37
3	7 0.09 0.74 3.07	102 1.36 10.73 5.01	386 5.13 40.59 10.13	119 1.58 12.51 25.54	337 4.48 35.44 34.18	951 12.64
4	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	15 0.20 6.94 0.74	95 1.26 43.98 2.49	68 0.90 31.48 14.59	38 0.51 17.59 3.85	216 2.87
5	0.01 0.33 0.44	24 0.32 7.89 1.18	212 2.82 69.74 5.57	60 0.80 19.74 12.88	7 0.09 2.30 0.71	304 4.04
6	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	69 0.92 13.40 3.39	387 5.14 75.15 10.16	44 0.58 8.54 9.44	. 15 0.20 2.91 1.52	515 6.84
TOTAL	228 3.03	2035 27.05	3809 50.62	466 6.19	986 13.10	7524 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT	<i>i</i> 1	3	!4	15	ļ 6	TOTAL
0	193 2.03 4.86 78.46	1386 14.60 34.91 94.61	2191 23.08 55.19 38.99	55 0.58 1.39 5.99	145 1.53 3.65 11.66	3970 41.82
1	18 0.19 1.99 7.32	29 0.31 3.20 1.98	682 7.18 75.28 12.14	47 0.50 5.19 5.12	130 1.37 14.35 10.45	906 9.54
2	18 0.19 1.14 7.32	33 0.35 2.08 2.25	1006 10.60 63.51 17.90	106 1.12 6.69 11.55	421 4.43 26.58 33.84	1584 16.69
3	11 0.12 0.90 4.47	15 0.16 1.23 1.02	590 7.27 56.74 12.28	149 1.57 12.25 16.23	351 3.70 28.87 28.22	1216 12.81
4	0.04 0.47 1.63	9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00	422 4.45 49.18 7.51	267 2.81 31.12 29.08	165 1.74 19.23 13.26	858 9.04
5	2 0.02 0.21 0.81	2 0.02 0.21 0.14	629 6.63 65.59	294 3.10 30.66 32.03	32 0.34 3.34 2.57	959 10.10
6	0 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00	9.09	0.00	0.00
TOTAL	246 2.59	1465 15.43	5620 59.20	918 9.67	1244 13.10	9493 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL

REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT			4	5	16 !	TOTAL
0	53 0.65 3.97 51.46	576 7.01 43.18 72.27	635 7.73 47.60 16.06	20 0.24 1.50 1.86	50 0.61 3.75 2.18	1334 16.23
1	12 0.15 1.47 11.65	63 0.77 7.72 7.90	555 6.75 68.01 14.04	59 0.72 7.23 5.49	127 1.55 15.56 5.55	816 9.93
2	29 0.35 0.88 28.16	142 1.73 4.31 17.82	1673 20.36 50.77 42.31	301 3.66 9.14 28.03	1150 14.00 34.90 50.24	3295 40.10
3	9.09 9.65 5.80	12 0.15 1.12 1.51	427 5.20 39.87 10.80	151 1.84 14.10 14.06	474 5.77 44.26 20.71	1071
4	0.02 0.19 1.94	0.02 0.19 0.25	344 4.19 32.61 8.70	293 3.57 27.77 27.28	414 5.04 39.24 18.09	1055 12.84
5	9.00 9.00 9.00	0.02 0.31 0.25	320 3.89 49.54 8.09	250 3.04 38.70 23.28	74 0.90 11.46 3.23	646 7.86
6	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.00	9.00
TOTAL	103 1.25	797 9.70	3954 48.12	1074 13.07	2259 27.86	+ 8217 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SR8 LEVEL

. REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT	į į	3	4	[5	[6	TOTAL
9	179 1.93 6.27 83.26	1083 11.65 37.92 91.94	1142 12.29 39.99 26.23	97 1.04 3.40 11.98	355 3.82 12.43 12.98	2856 30.73
1	5 0.05 1.07 2.33	24 0.26 5.15 2.04	314 / 3.38 67.38 7.21	34 0.37 7.30 4.20	89 0.96 19.10 3.25	466 5.01
2	17 0.18 0.60 7.91	57 0.61 2.02 4.84	1505 16.19 53.46 34.57	300 3.23 10.66 37.04	936 10.07 33.25 34.21	2815 30.29
3	13 9.14 9.69 6.05	13 0.14 0.60 1.10	1024 11.02 47.17 23.52	238 2.56 10.96 29.38	883 9.50 40.67 32.27	2171 23.36
4	1 0.01 0.13 0.47	1 0.01 0.13 0.08	302 3.25 40.59 6.94	89 0.96 11.96 10.99	351 3.78 47.18 12.83	744 8.01
5	0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00	9.00 9.00 9.00	67 0.72 27.80 1.54	52 0.56 21.58 6.42	122 1.31 50.62 4.46	241 2.59
6	0.00	0 . 00 0 . 00	0.00	0.00	9.00	9.00
TOTAL	215 2.31	1178 12.68	4354 46.85	8:0 8.72	2736 29.44	9293 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY

PERCENT ROW PCT						
COL PCT	12	13	14	5	16	TOTAL
0	176 2.32 5.65 78.92	569 7.52 18.26 91.04	1468 19.39 47.11 38.02	163 2.15 5.23 27.53	740 9.77 23.75 32.60	3116 41.16
1	13 0.17 3.59 5.83	17 0.22 4.70 2.72	212 2.80 58.56 5.49	26 0.34 7.18 4.39	94 1.24 25.97 4.14	362 4.78
2	28 0.37 1.13 12.56	29 0.38 1.17 4.64	1529 20.20 61.85 39.60	226 2.99 9.14 38.18	660 8.72 26.70 29.07	2472 32.65
3	0.05 2.03 1.79	2 0.03 1.02 0.32	89 1.18 45.18 2.31	25 0.33 12.69 4.22	77 1.02 39.09 3.39	197 2.60
4	2 0.03 0.14 0.90	8 0.11 0.56 1.28	563 7.44 39.54 14.58	152 2.01 10.67 25.68	699 9.23 49.09 30.79	1424 18.81
5	9.00 0.00 0.00	9.99 . 9.99	0.00 0.00	0 0.00	9 9.99	0 0.00
6	0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00	0 0.00
TOTAL	223 2.95	625 8.26	3861 51.00	592 7.82	2270 29.98	7571 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB LEVEL

REEN LENGTH

EDECHIENCY

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT		3	14	15	!6	! TOTAL
0	165 2.94 10.99 63.95	598 10.66 39.81 89.12	654 11.66 43.54 20.30	19 0.34 1.26 7.79	66 1.18 4.39 5.44	1502 26.78
1	7 0.12 2.25 2.71	20 0.36 6.43 2.98	237 4.23 76.21 7.36	11 0.20 3.54 4.51	36 0.64 11.58 2.97	311 5.55
2	42 0.75 2.89 16.28	35 0.62 2.41 5.22	1001 17.85 68.84 31.07	67 1.19 4.61 27.46	309 5.51 21.25 25.47	1454 25.93
3	15 0.27 3.03 5.81	5 0.09 1.01 0.75	312 5.56 63.03 9.68	35 0.62 7.07 14.34	128 2.28 25.86 10.55	495 8.83
4	27 0.48 1.63 10.47	13 0.23 0.78 1.94	928 16.55 55.87 28.80	97 1.73 5.84 39.75	596 10.63 35.88 49.13	1661 29.52
5	2 0.04 1.08 0.78	9 9.00 9.00 9.00	90 1.60 48.65 2.79	15 0.27 8.11 6.15	78 1.39 42.16 6.43	185 3.30
6	9 9.99 9.99	9.99 9.99	0.00	9.00 9.00	0.00 0.00	0 0.00
TOTAL	258 4.60	671 11.97	3222 57.45	244 4.35	1213 21.63	5608 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

SRB REEN LENGTH LEVEL

FREQUENCY | PERCENT |

PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT	 2	3	14	15	6	TOTAL
9	199 4.07 7.29 81.89	1091 22.29 39.96 96.12	1372 28.03 50.26 44.65	5 0.10 0.18 6.41	63 1.29 2.31 17.21	2730 55.77
1	17 0.35 3.31 7.00	31 0.63 6.04 2.73	436 8.91 84.99 14.19	2 0.04 0.39 2.56	27 0.55 5.26 7.38	513 10.48
2	12 0.25 3.14 4.94	5 0.10 1.31 0.44	298 6.09 78.01 9.70	17 0.35 4.45 21.79	50 1.02 13.09 13.66	382 7.80
3	9 0.18 2.21 3.70	4 9.08 9.98 9.35	339 6.93 83.09 11.03	17 0.35 4.17 21.79	39 0.80 9.56 10.66	408 8.34
4	6 9.12 9.71 2.47	4 0.08 0.48 0.35	618 12.63 73.40 20.11	37 0.76 4.39 47.44	177 3.62 21 02 48.36	842 17.20
5	0 0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00 0.00	10 0.20 50.00 0.33	9 . 00 9 . 00 9 . 00	10 0.20 50.00 2.73	20 0.41
6	9.99 • • • •	9.00 9.00	9 9.99 9.99	9 9.99	0 0.00 0.00	9 9.99
TOTAL	243 4.96	1135 23.19	3073 62.78	78 1.59	366 7.48	4895 100.00

Table C-2. (Continued)

DEC_FY=90 (NOTE: INCLUDES ONLY DECISIONS THROUGH JUNE 1990)

SRB LEVEL

REEN LENGTH

FREQUENCY PERCENT ROW PCT COL PCT	İ	3]4	15	6	TOTAL
0	93 2.62 3.67 93.00	1322 37.31 52.13 97.71	1086 30.65 42.82 59.80	6 0.17 0.24 10.71	29 0.82 1.14 13.30	2536 71.58
1	2 0.06 1.45 2.00	16 0.45 11.59 1.18	116 3.27 84.06 6.39	3 0.08 2.17 5.36	1 0.03 0.72 0.46	138 3.90
2	9.99 9.99 9.99	5 0.14 5.26 0.37	77 2.17 81.05 4.24	1 0.03 1.05 1.79	12 0.34 12.63 5.50	95 2.68
3	1 0.03 0.65 1.00	3 0.08 1.96 0.22	119 3.36 77.78 6.55	10 0.28 6.54 17.86	20 0.56 13.07 9.17	153 4.32
4	0.11 0.91 4.00	3 0.08 0.58 0.22	325 9.17 74.20 17.90	16 0.45 3.65 28.57	90 2.54 20.55 41.28	438 12.36
5	0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00	4 0.11 2.19 0.30	93 2.62 50.82 5.12	20 0.56 10.93 35.71	66 1.86 36.07 30.28	183 5.17
6	9.99 9.99	9.99 9.99	0.00 0.00	0.00	9.99 9.99	0.00
TOTAL	100 2.82	1353 38.19	1816 51.26	56 1.58	218 6.15	5543 100.00

APPENDIX D

THE LOGIT EQUATION

APPENDIX D

THE LOGIT EQUATION

The following is a more complete discussion of the logit equation used to estimate the probability of reenlistment in the Marine Corps.

$$P(reenlist) = (1 + e^{-B'x})^{-1},$$

where P is the probability, B' is a row vector of coefficients, and X is a column vector of variables. Figure 7 in the main text shows an example of a logit curve.

The partial derivative of the logit function at the mean of the function is as follows:

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial x_i} - (\overline{P})(1 - \overline{P})B \quad ,$$

where i is the ith variable and \overline{P} is the sample mean or proportion. The following equations illustrate this result:

$$P = (1 + e^{-B'x})^{-1} ;$$

$$1 - P = (e^{-B'x})(1 + e^{-B'x})^{-1} ;$$

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial x_i} = -(1 + e^{-B'x})^{-2} (-B_i e^{-B'x}) ,$$

$$= (1 + e^{-B'x})^{-1} \frac{(B_i)(e^{-B'x})}{(1 + e^{-B'x})} ,$$

$$= P(B_i)(1 - P) ,$$

$$= B_i(P)(1 - P) .$$

APPENDIX E

LOGIT REENLISTMENT EQUATION ESTIMATES WITH SEPARATE INDICATOR VARIABLES FOR EACH SRB LEVEL

Table E-1. Logit coefficients and derivatives for reenlistment decisions, FY 1980 through FY 1990

		Specific	ation 1	Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
SRB1	.098	.384 ** (7.32)	.084	.349** (6.81)	.077	
SRB2	.166	.701** (15.74)	.154	.729** (17.20)	.160	
SRB3	.080	.927** (16.59)	. 203	.970** (17.81)	.213	
SRB4	.069	1.253** (20.36)	. 275	1.193** (19.82)	.261	
SRB5	.023	1.345** (13.84)	. 295	1.378** (14.39)	. 302	
SRB6	.008	1.718** (11.18)	. 376	1.601** (10.48)	.351	
SRB_AFQT12	.110	.157* (2.22)	.034	.134* (1.91)	. 029	
AFQT12	. 227	207** (-3.74)	045	177 ** (-3.20)	039	
Cpl	. 588	.649** (16.28)	.142	.645** (16.32)	.141	
Sgt	.179	.975 ** (18.75)	.214	.984** (19.14)	.216	
SSgt	.003	2.142** (7.71)	.469	2.152** (7.83)	. 472	
Married or dependents	.380	827 ** (28.32)	.181	.830** (28.61)	.182	
Pay index	1.167	No		2.563** (7.87)	. 562	
Civilian unemployment	.116	No	••	2.795** (4.40)	.612	

Table E-1. (Continued)

		Specific	ation 1	Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
Length of first contract	3.807	.100 ** (2.92)	.022	.078* (2.34)	.017	
Prior extension	.110	.439** (9.77)	.096	.454** (10.18)	.100	
Male	.952	228** (-3.50)	050	235** (-3.62)	052	
HSDG	. 844	109** (-2.71)	024	114** (-2.85)	025	
Black	.180	1.074** (28.86)	.235	1.069** (28.95)	. 234	
Hispanic	.057	.142* (2.26)	.031	.122* (1.97)	.027	
Infantry	.277	446** (-11.08)	098	421** (-10.55)	092	
Air mechanical, fixed-wing	.057	238** (-3.67)	052	208** (-3.21)	046	
Air mechanical, helicopter	.031	301** (-3.58)	066	260** (-3.11)	057	
Air, technical	.086	493** (-7.93)	108	462** (-7.49)	101	
Air, other	.039	051 (67)	011	027 (351)	006	
Other, technical	.097	-0.086 (-1.57)	019	082 (-1.50)	018	
Administrative	.131	.432** (9.16)	.095	.448** (9.55)	.098	
FY 1980	. 094	706** (-7.49)	155	No		
FY 1981	.080	268** (-2.90)	059	No	•-	

Table E-1. (Continued)

		Specific	ation 1	Specification 2		
	Mean value	Coefficient	Derivative	Coefficient	Derivative	
FY 1982	.081	299** (-3.43)	066	No		
FY 1983	. 084	.047 (.600)	.010	No		
FY 1984	.090	.277** (3.67)	.061	No	••	
FY 1985	.095	043 (56)	009	No		
FY 1986	.106	.323** (4.37)	.071	No		
FY 1987	.100	.226 ** (3.05)	.050	No	~ ~	
FY 1988	.105	425** (-5.61)	093	No		
FY 1989	.088	226** (-2.94)	050	No		
AFQT missing	.290	.272** (4.87)	.060	.169** (3.27)	.037	
Constant	1.00	-2.244** (-13.32)	••	-5.548** (-13.45)		
Chi-square		4,7	40.0	4,4	94.0	
Number of observations		26	,840	26	,840	

NOTES: (1) The number in parentheses beneath each coefficient is an asymptotic t-statistic.

(3) * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5-percent level (two-tailed test).

^{(2) **} Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-percent level (two-tailed test).

APPENDIX F

LOGIT REENLISTMENT EQUATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL MOSS

APPENDIX F

LOGIT REENLISTMENT EQUATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL MOSS

This appendix provides estimates of the derivatives from reenlistment equations estimated separately for each of the following PMOSs:

- 0231 Intelligence Specialist (table F-1)
- 0311 Rifleman (table F-2)
- 0431 Logistic/Embarkation Specialist (table F-3)
- 1371 Combat Engineer (table F-4)
- 2531 Field Radio Operator (table F-5)
- 3043 Supply Administration and Operation Clerk (table F-6)
- 3531 Motor Vehicle Operator (table F-7)
- 5811 Military Police (table F-8)

Table F-1. MOS 0231: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 453 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

			Specif	ication						
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Corporal	.020	007	.032	.007	.041	.019				
	(.16)	(06)	(.27)	(.06)	(.34)	(.16)				
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.088	.0,70	.107	.089	.126	.113				
	(.71)	(.56)	(.90)	(.76)	(1.04)	(.93)				
AFQT12	300	068	281	076	266	078				
·	(-2.51)			(-1.05)		(-1.07)				
SRB_AFT12	.323	No	.285	No	. 263	No				
_	(2.51)		(2.32)		(2.02)					
HSDG	.010	.035	.004	.023	.009	.030				
	(.13)				(.12)	(.39)				
		•			(.12)	(.33)				
Black	. 233	.239	. 229	. 234	. 228	.232				
	(2.20)	(2.27)	(2.25)	(2.30)	(2.22)	(2.26)				
Hispanic	.307	.335	. 348	. 383	.359	. 398				
	(1.10)	(1.18)	(1.24)			(1.40)				
Married or dependents	.095	.087	.109	.100	.103	.094				
•	(1.73)				(1.92)	(1.78)				
Length of first	.035	.031	.033	.027	.033	.028				
contract	(1.00)			(.81)	(.97)	(.82)				
Prior extension	. 086	.093	.034	. 044	.034	.034				
	(1.04)				(.42)	(.43)				
SRB level	. 028	.072	. 048	. 082	No	No				
20102	(.85)		(2.29)		110	NO				
SRB level 1	No	No	No	No	.179	.301				
	110	210	110	110	(.95)	(1.68)				
SRB level 3	No	No	No	No	.218	. 347				
	110	110	110	110	(2.09)	(4.06)				
SRB level 4	Ma	Me	Ma	M-	160	201				
OTT TEACT 4	No	No	No	No	.169	. 304				
					(1.80)	(4.44)				
SRB level 5	No	No	No	No	.330	.466				
					(2.71)	(4.55)				

Table F-1. (Continued)

			Specifi	ication		
<u>Variable</u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fiscal year variables	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Unemployment rate	No	No	5.80 (4.46)	5.82 (4.41)	5.796 (4.29)	5.540 (4.13)
Pay index	No	No	2.347 (3.46)	2.409 (3.45)	2.589 (3.48)	2.738 (3.56)
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-square ^a	112.8	106.3	98.3	92.7	101.5	97.3
Average reenlistment rate	. 536	. 536	.536	. 536	.536	. 536

NOTE: The 453 decisions represent all zone A reenlistments from FY 1980 through June 1990 for MOS 0231.

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

Table F-2. MOS 0311: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 3,437 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

		Specif	cation	
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corporal	.120	.126	.120	.127
	(6.78)	(7.14)	(6.80)	(7.17)
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.217	.230	.215	. 229
	(8.29)	(8.95)	(8.20)	(3.90)
AFQT12	011	009	013	011
	(54)	(42)	(66)	(55)
HSDG	010	013	011	013
	(53)	(71)	(59)	(71)
Black	.151	.155	.152	.156
	(9.27)	(9.52)	(9.35)	(9.58)
Hispanic	047	047	046	045
	(-1.45)	(-1.44)	(-1.42)	(-1.39)
Married or dependents	.118	.118	.117	.118
•	(8.42)	(8.45)	(8.35)	(8.41)
Length of first contract	.028	.028	.033	.031
	(1.76)	(1.85)	(2.09)	(2.00)
Prior extension	.106	.106	.102	.104
	(4.76)	(4.78)	(4.59)	(4.72)
SRB level	.064	.063	No	No
	(6.56)	(9.05)		
SRB level one	No	No	.091	.048
			(3.30)	(2.09)
SRB level two	No	No	.154	.142
			(7.17)	(8.31)
SRB level three	No	No	.117	.161
			(3.07)	(6.19)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table F-2. (Continued)

Variable	Specification			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No
Unemployment rates	No	.691 (2.01)	No	.748 (2.14)
Pay index	No	.108 (.57)	No	.087 (.45)
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-square ^a	455.8	428.6	465.6	432.0
Average reenlistment rate	. 224	.224	.224	.224

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

Table F-3. MOS 0431: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 930 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specification			
<u>Variable</u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corporal	.048	.010	.045	.017
	(.88)	(.20)	(.82)	(.32)
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.169	.105	.163	.115
	(2.50)	(1.64)	(2.40)	(1.77)
AFQT12	.088	.074	.084	.072
•	(1.83)	(1.63)	(1.73)	(1.59)
HSDG	044	039	050	040
	(90)	(82)	(-1.03)	(83)
Black	.183	.183	.183	.186
	(3.97)	(4.09)	(3.97)	(4.15)
Hispanic	009	028	021	031
	(12)	(39)	(28)	(42)
Married or dependents	.182	.172	.180	.172
	(4.73)	(4.62)	(4.64)	(4.59)
Length of first contract	.033	.044	.034	.035
	(.87)	(1.20)	(.88)	(.96)
Prior extension	.127	.137	.241	.138
	(2.36)	(2.62)	(2.48)	(2.64)
SRB level	.151	.114	No	No
	(6.94)	(7.17)		
SRB level one	No	No	002	.023
			(-,02)	(.29)
SRB level two	No	No	. 272	. 248
			(5.55)	(6.34)
SRB level four	No	No	.891	.409
			(5.43)	(4.79)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No

Table F-3. (Continued)

	Specification				
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Unemployment rate	No	3.391 (4.01)	No	3.276 (3.82)	
Pay index	No	1.341 (3.24)	No	1.430 (3.41)	
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Chi-square ^a	192.1	157.1	199.5	159.2	
Average reenlistment rate	.442	.442	.442	.442	

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

Table F-4. MOS 1371: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 524 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specification			
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corporal	.095	.099	.099	.104
-	(1.82)	(1.96)	(1.89)	(2.05)
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.203	.215	. 207	.217
	(2.72)	(2.93)	(2.77)	(2.95)
AFQT12	.032	.034	.029	.034
	(.46)	(.50)	(.40)	(.49)
HSDG	012 ⁻	011	011	010
	(20)	(20)	(19)	(18)
Black	.264	.286	.257	.275
•	(4.35)	(4.84)	(4.23)	(4.60)
Hispanic	.177	.182	.169	.187
	(1.94)	(2.06)	(1.86)	(2.09)
Married or dependents	.182	.169	.182	.167
	(3.89)	(3.77)	(3.89)	(3.71)
Length of first contract	.238	.232	. 241	. 234
	(4.46)	(4.50)	(4.49)	(4.51)
Prior extension	037	052	034	053
	(50)	(72)	(46)	(73)
SRB level	.118	.083	No	No
	(3.29)	(3.86)		
SRB level one	No	No	.0004	. 175
			(.00)	(2.30)
SRB level two	No	No	. 273	. 256
			(2.92)	(3.43)
SRB level three	No	No	. 344	. 257
			(3.14)	(3.69)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
=				

Table F-4. (Continued)

	Specification			
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No
Unemployment rates	No	369 (35)	No	.125 (.11)
Pay index	No	.855 (1.65)	No	.675 (1.27)
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-square ^a	125.5	113.3	126.7	116.1
Average reenlistment rate	.261	.261	.261	. 261

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels. There are no women Marines in this MOS.

Table F-5. MOS 2531: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 1,268 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specification				
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Corporal	.113 (3.50)	.111 (3.55)	.115 (3.55)	.110 (3.53)	
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.222 (4.05)	. 225 (4.20)	.223 (4.05)	.229 (4.24)	
Male	.003	.006 (.11)	.005 (.09)	.008 (.14)	
AFQT12	064 (-1.44)	058 (-1.33)	062 (-1.40)	054 (-1.24)	
HSDG	.005 (.13)	.005 (.13)	.015 (.38)	.012 (.32)	
Black	.184 (5.83)	.182 (5.88)	.187 (5.91)	.183 (.96)	
Hispanic	.019 (.32)	.013 (.21)	.017 (.28)	.010 (.17)	
Married or dependents	.146 (5.18)	.129 (4.59)	.149 (5.26)	.134 (4.75)	
Length of first contract	.019 (.61)	.004 (.12)	.017 (.55)	.003 (.10)	
Prior extension	.079 (1.76)	.079 (1.82)	.081 (1.80)		
SRB level	.172 (6.73)	.142 (8.87)	No	No	
SRB level one	No	No	.370 (3.90)	. 299 (4. 34)	
SRB level two	No	No	.311 (3.90)	.271 (8.35)	
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No	

Table F-5. (Continued)

	Specification				
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Unemployment rate	No	.893 (1.44)	No	.594 (.90)	
Pay index	No	.706 (2.27)	No	.711 (2.26)	
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Chi-square ^a	224.4	203.2	229.4	208.6	
Average reenlistment rate	. 256	. 256	.256	. 256	

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

Table F-6. MOS 3043: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 566 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specification			
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corporal	.022	.023	. 024	.016
•	(.32)			
Sgt/Staff Sgt	. 294	.279	. 293	. 267
	(3.38)	(3.35)	(3.37)	(3.20)
Male	175			
	(-2.46)	(-2.39)	(-2.50)	(-2.43)
AFQT12	014	.018	013	.006
	(22)	(.30)	(20)	(.10)
HSDG	.060	.042	.061	.045
	(.83)	(.60)	(.84)	(.66)
Black	. 274	. 265	. 271	. 271
	(4.60)	(4.66)	(4.56)	(4.75)
Hispanic	.069	.029	.069	.031
	(.69)	(.30)	(.69)	(.33)
Married or dependents	.173	.172	.170	.167
	(3.53)	(3.65)	(3.43)	(3.51)
Length of first contract	.171	.136	.169	.145
	(3.18)	(2.65)	(3.14)	(2.81)
Prior extension	.051	.076	.054	.078
	(.62)	(.98)	(.66)	(.99)
SRB level	.147		No	No
	(5.25)	(4.41)		
SRB level one	No	No	.141	.036
			(1.48)	(.49)
SRB level two	No	No	. 295	.111
			(3.70)	(1.81)
SRB level three or four	No	No	.481	.312
			(4.69)	(4.42)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table F-6. (Continued)

	Specification				
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Unemployment rate	No	.831 (.89)	No	1.083 (1.09)	
Pay index	No	052 (10)	No	052 (10)	
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Chi-square ^a	129.8	100.8	127.2	101.4	
Average reenlistment rate	.443	.443	.443	.443	

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

Table F-7. MOS 3531: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 1,140 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specif	ication
Variable	(1)	(2)_
Corporal	.123 (3.26)	.102 (3.01)
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.336 (5.05)	.304 (5.08)
Male	215 (-2.81)	207 (-3.05)
AFQT12	080 (-1.31)	085 (-1.54)
HSDG	057 (-1.24)	049 (-1.19)
Black	.307 (8.16)	.270 (7.99)
Hispanic	.168 (2.67)	.147 (2.54)
Married or dependents	.192 (5.96)	.175 (6.01)
Length of first contract	016 (42)	013 (39)
Prior extension	.143 (2.89)	.135 (3.05)
SRB level ^a	.158 (4.35)	.136 (7.98)
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No
Unemployment rate	No	1.054 (1.42)
Pay index	No	464 (-1.35)

Table F-7. (Continued)

	Specification		
Variable	(1)	(2)	
Constant	Yes	Yes	
Chi-square	272.6	249.7	
Average reenlistment rate	.309	. 309	

a. MOS 3531 has only had a zero-level and a level-two SRB bonus in the 7910 through 9006 period. Thus, the SRB level variable assumes only one meaningful value, and the specifications with the individual levels cannot be estimated.

Table F-8. MOS 5811: Derivatives at the average reenlistment rate, 514 decisions (derived from logit equation estimates)

	Specification						
<u>Variable</u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Corporal	.147	.136	.151	.139			
•	(1.90)	(2.17)	(1.94)	(2.20)			
Sgt/Staff Sgt	.128	.116	.130	.114			
	(1.43)	(1.57)	(1.45)	(1.55)			
Male	102		109	068			
	(91)	(73)	(97)	(73)			
AFQT12		103					
	(-1.67)	(-1.75)	(-1.74)	(-1.75)			
HSDG	153		148	136			
	(-2.16)	(-2.41)	(-2.08)	(-2.32)			
Black	.404	. 335	. 412	. 336			
	(5.51)	(5.52)	(5.56)	(5.54)			
Hispanic	.133	.116	.137	.123			
	(1.30)	(1.36)	(1.34)	(1.44)			
Married or dependents	.114	.107	.114	.107			
	(2.26)	(2.51)	(2.24)	(2.52)			
Length of first contract	066	093	062	092			
	(94)	(-1.56)	(88)	(-1.56)			
Prior extension	.065	.071	.074	.078			
	(.86)	(1.13)	(.97)	(1.23)			
SRB level	.259	.192	No	No			
	(5.75)	(8.46)					
SRB level one	No	No	. 444	. 307			
			(2.82)	(2.79)			
SRB level two	No	No	. 543	. 396			
			(5.59)	(7.38)			
SRB level three	No	No	. 674	.562			
			(3.69)	(6.92)			
Missing AFQT	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
-							

Table F-8. (Continued)

	Specification						
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Fiscal year variables	Yes	No	Yes	No			
Unemployment rate	No	.415 (.32)	No	.296 (.22)			
Pay index	No	2.496 (4.42)	No	2.452 (4.32)			
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Chi-square ^a	168.7	160.3	170.7	161.6			
Average reenlistment rate	.302	. 302	.302	.302			

a. The chi-square statistic is an overall statistic describing the fit of the equation. Technically, it is (-2)[(ln likelihood of the logit with just a constant term) minus (ln likelihood of the full logit)]. All chi-square values reported in this paper are statistically significant at very high levels.

APPENDIX G

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON IN-YEAR VERSUS EARLY REENLISTMENTS

Table G-1. Logit equation results for various reenlistment outcomes: FY 1989 decisions

	Reenlistment outcome ^a					
	Probability of reenlisting		If reenlisting, probability of reenlisting early		Probability of in-year reenlistment (exclude early reenlistments)	
Variable	Coeff.	Der.b	Coeff.	Der.	Coeff.	Der.
SRB_LEV	.167** (12.38)	.033	.315** (12.13)	.061	.078 ** (5.07)	.014
AFQT12	071 (-1.60)	- *	.298 ** (3.57)	.059	142** (-2.82)	025
HSDG	.016 (.25)		.215 (1.69)		029 (41)	
Corporal	.518** (10.67)	.103	435** (-4.52)	085	.627** (11.31)	.109
Sgt./Staff Sgt.	1.240** (15.24)	. 248	224 (-1.60)		1.273** (13.68)	.222
Five-year obligors	1.685 ** (4.79)	. 336	1.926** (4.68)	. 378	1.171* (2.51)	. 204
Six-year obligors	.505 ** (4.38)	.101	1.498** (8.67)	. 294	161 (-1.07)	
Married or dependents	.733 ** (20.06)	.146	.044 (.62)		.703** (17.17)	.122
Male	.092 (1.09)	• •	.133 (.82)	~ ~	.080 (.87)	
Black	.916 ** (19.88)	.183	310** (-3.57)	061	.978 ** (19.53)	.170
Hispanic	.400** (5.04)	.080	184 (-1.17)	~ -	.457 ** (5.25)	.080
Infantry	330** (-6.60)	066	.370** (3.70)	.073	434** (-7.64)	076
Air mechanical, fixed-wing	.084 (1.01)		442** (-2.86)	087	.174 (1.87)	••
Air mechanical, helicopter	252* (-2.29)	050	820** (-3.46)	161	092 (78)	
Air, technical	137 (-1.83)		547** (-3.90)	107	035 (41)	••

Table G-1. (Continued)

	Reenlistment outcome ^a						
	Probability of reenlisting		If reenlisting, probability of reenlisting early		Probability of in-year reenlistment (exclude early reenlistments)		
Variable	Coeff.	Der.b	Coeff.	Der.	Coeff.	Der.	
Other, air	015 (16)	*-	122 (71)		.028 (.25)		
Other, technical	174* (-2.41)	035	173 (-1.08)		149 (-1.90)		
Administration	.591** (10.02)	.118	021 (19)		.622 ** (9.69)	.108	
Constant	-2.247 (-19.10)		-1.559 (-6.73)	•-	-2.411 (-18.52)	••	
Number of observations	17,059		4,698		15,331		
Mean dependent variable	. 275		.268		. 224		

NOTES: (1) The number in parentheses beneath each coefficient is an asymptotic t-statistic.

(2) ** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-percent level.

(3) * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

a. The populations are recommended and eligible Marines in zone A who made decisions in FY 1989 and had initial contracts of four, five, or six years. The small number of observations with missing AFQT scores were omitted. The population used to estimate the probability of early reenlistment in the middle equation includes only reenlistments. The population used to estimate the probability of in-year reenlistment excludes those who were reenlisting early.

b. Der. - derivative. Derivatives, calculated at the mean of the data, are reported only for statistically significant coefficient estimates.

4

€